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Much research in recent years has focused on using static analysis to find
bugs in software. Many new approaches employing sophisticated program analysis
techniques—inter-procedural, context-sensitive, or path-sensitive—have been devel-
oped. However, comparatively little work has been done on determining what bugs
can be found using simple analysis techniques. We have found that simple static
analysis techniques are effective at finding hundreds or thousands of serious software
defects in several large commercial software applications.
In our research, we have attempted to characterize the bugs that can be found
in production software using simple analysis techniques. Examples of simple analysis
techniques include inspection of class hierarchies and method signatures, sequential
scanning of program instructions using a state machine recognizer, intra-procedural
dataflow analysis, and flow-insensitive whole program analysis. To determine what
bugs may be found using these techniques, we performed bug-driven research. Start-
ing from examples of real bugs, we tried to develop simple analysis techniques to find
similar bugs. Using this approach, we found a large number of serious bugs in pro-
duction applications and libraries with a relatively low percentage of false positives.
The types of bugs our analysis uncovered in production code include null pointer
dereferences, infinite recursive loops, data races, deadlocks, and missed thread noti-
fications. One product of this work is a static analysis tool called FindBugs, which
analyzes Java programs at the bytecode level. We have distributed FindBugs under
an open-source license, and it has been widely adopted by commercial organizations
and open-source projects. FindBugs has been downloaded more than 110,000 times
since its initial release.
Our work makes several contributions to the field. First, we have cataloged
many commonly-occurring bug patterns, described effective ways of finding occur-
rences of those patterns automatically, and classified common reasons why these
bugs occur. Second, we have measured the accuracy of our bug detectors on pro-
duction software and student programming projects, validating the effectiveness of
the underlying static analysis techniques. Finally, we have described techniques for
determining when static analysis warnings are added or removed as software evolves.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to a NIST study published in 2002 [57], bugs in software cost the U.S.
economy $60 billion annually. Thus, research on techniques to find bugs early in the
development process, before they enter production systems, is an important research
topic. In this dissertation, we show that a significant class of bugs can be found
through simple, local static analysis.
1.1 What is a Bug?
Before we can think about techniques to find bugs in software, we must first un-
derstand what bugs are. A software bug is a defect in the software: a failure of
the software to work as intended. This definition points out a critical problem: in
order to identify bugs in a software artifact, we need to know what the software is
intended to do.
Unfortunately, the intent behind software—what it is supposed to do—is often
nebulous. Most software is developed in an environment of vague and constantly
changing requirements. Since these requirements are never known with certainty,
the scope of any automatic technique to find bugs is limited. For example, an
automatic tool will not be able to diagnose the fact that a software artifact does
not work as intended because an important requirement was never conveyed to the
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developers of the software.
In the absence of requirements and specifications, there are still two kinds of
defects we can find. First, some software behaviors may be considered erroneous
no matter what the software is intended to do. For example, there are very few
situations where dereferencing a null pointer results in useful behavior, so classifying
null pointer dereferences as bugs should be uncontroversial. Another, more subtle,
means of finding defects is looking for inconsistencies in the code. For example,
checking a condition usually implies that the programmer believes that the condition
can be either true or false. If a condition is actually predetermined at compile time,
it may mean that the programmer did not understand important code invariants,
suggesting that a logic error exists in the code. This way of finding bugs is interesting
because it does not directly identify a defect; instead, it identifies code suspected of
being related to an unknown defect.
Neither of these approaches identify bugs with 100% certainty. Occasionally,
a method will dereference a null pointer deliberately in order to raise a runtime
exception. A condition whose behavior is fixed at compile time may simply indicate
that debugging code is present. Even so, techniques that identify probable bugs are
still valuable. As long as the probability of finding a real bug is sufficiently high to
make inspecting a report worth a developer’s time, these approaches may be used
productively to find real errors in software.
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1.2 Techniques to Find Bugs in Software
Many techniques exist to find bugs in software, each of which has different advan-
tages and disadvantages.
In software testing, software is executed with varying input to determine if the
correct output is produced in each case. Unit tests are used to check fine-grained be-
havior, such as individual functions, methods, and classes. Larger units of code may
be tested at the module, component, subsystem, or system level. Testing is useful
to verify that functionality at each level of the software system works as intended.
Because tests can generally be automated (run without human intervention), they
may be applied frequently. For example, a test suite may be executed nightly to
help detect bugs that were introduced since the last testing cycle.
The main limitation in testing is that it is notoriously difficult to construct a
test suite that achieves a high degree of code coverage. For example, error paths
are difficult to exercise through testing. In general, even relatively simple programs
can exhibit an infinite number of possible behaviors at runtime, making exhaustive
testing an impossibility. For these reasons, it is easy to use testing to verify that
basic software functionality works as expected, but difficult to use testing to find as
yet unknown bugs.
In code inspection [28], software developers inspect source code to look for
bugs. One advantage of code inspection over testing is that humans can employ
high-level reasoning about code to find erroneous behaviors. Code inspections also
have the advantage of easily analyzing difficult-to-execute regions of the program,
3
In class org.eclipse.update.internal.core.ConfiguredSite
if (in == null)
try {
in.close();
} catch (IOException e1) {
}
Figure 1.1: A trivial null pointer bug in Eclipse 3.0.1
such as error handling paths.
The main limitation of code inspections is that they are time-consuming, and
therefore expensive, to perform. A more subtle limitation of code inspections is sub-
jectivity: human readers are sometimes influenced by what code looks like it should
do, rather than what it actually does. As evidence, consider the code in Figure 1.1
taken from Eclipse 3.0.1 [19]. At first glance, it is obvious that this code is meant
to close the input stream in if it is non-null. However, the programmer inadver-
tently used the wrong reference comparison operator (== instead of the correct !=),
resulting in code which closes the input stream only if it is null. Although we do not
know whether or not this particular code was ever the subject of a code inspection,
we do know that this was one of about 30 similar null pointer dereference bugs in
the same version of Eclipse.
A correctness proof could be considered the ultimate guarantee that a program
is free of bugs. However, full correctness proofs are not widely used, for a variety
of reasons. The main reason is that a proof would require a complete specifica-
tion of the program’s behavior, and such specifications are extremely difficult to
construct. Also, in most software projects requirements evolve over time, resulting
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in the additional complication of making the specifications track a moving target.
Finally, even given complete specifications, constructing a proof is an extremely dif-
ficult task. Language features such as finite arithmetic, heap memory allocation,
concurrency, and I/O are difficult to model formally.
In addition to testing, code inspections, and proofs, there are many other ways
to find bugs and improve software quality. For example, the software process itself
can be studied and improved. For example, Extreme Programming [7] practices,
such as pair programming, have been widely adopted. However, in this dissertation
we are interested in using static analysis to find bugs.
1.3 Static Analysis
In static analysis, the source code or object code of a program P is fed as input
to another program S to determine properties (or likely properties) of P . A static
analysis to find bugs would produce as output some number of warnings, each
warning representing a potential bug in the program.
Using static analysis to find bugs has some advantages over the traditional
quality assurance techniques of testing and manual code inspections. Unlike testing,
static analysis can easily check hard-to-execute code paths such as error-handling
code. Compared to manual code inspection, static analysis is less easily confused
by what code appears to do, and is relatively inexpensive to apply. For these rea-
sons, static analysis to find bugs is a very active research area, and increasingly
is becoming a standard part of the quality assurance toolbox in real development
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projects.
The obvious limitation of static analysis is that most nontrivial program prop-
erties are undecidable. As a result, any static analysis technique must approximate
the behavior of the input program P . For this reason, no static analysis technique
can be both complete and sound. In the literature on using program analysis to find
bugs, sound generally means “finds every real bug”, and complete generally means
“reports only real bugs.”
In this dissertation, we will consider the result of applying a static analysis
to a program as producing some number of warnings. Each warning describes a
potential bug in the program. We refer to warnings which describe genuine software
defects as accurate warnings or real bugs. We refer to warnings which do not describe
real defects as false positives. Finally, if a real defect exists in a program, but it
is not described by any warning, it is a false negative or missed bug. Using this
terminology, a sound analysis is free from false negatives, and a complete analysis
is free from false positives.
Deciding how to approximate in a static analysis has important consequences.
Both soundness and completeness are desirable properties. In theory, a sound anal-
ysis is able to find every real instance of the kind of bugs the analysis is designed
to detect. However, it might do this by reporting 1,000 false positives for every
accurate warning, making use of the analysis unproductive. Similarly, a complete
analysis would only report definite bugs. However, it might find only a very small
number of bugs, leaving a large number of false negatives. For these reasons, tools
which are neither complete nor sound can serve a valuable role in the software qual-
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ity assurance process as long as they find a significant number of real bugs without
emitting too many false positives.
Another limitation of static analysis, as noted earlier, is that in the absence of
specifications it is impossible to know with certainty what software is intended to
do.
1.4 Thesis
The thesis for our research is as follows:
Simple analysis techniques can find an interesting class of serious bugs
in production software written in type-safe object-oriented programming
languages.
In recent years there much research has focused on static analysis techniques to
find bugs in software. Many of these techniques have used sophisticated analysis—
inter-procedural analysis, path- and context-sensitive analysis, heap modeling—in
order to find “deep” bugs. This work is valuable, and some of these techniques
(e.g., [9, 20, 15]) have become useful tools. Given unlimited resources, it would be
interesting to fully explore the space of bugs that can be found using static analysis,
including deep bugs requiring deep analysis.
However, not all bugs are “deep”. Many static analysis tools have been de-
veloped to find common bugs (e.g., [45, 26]). However, most of these tools were
developed to find relatively low-level errors in unsafe languages such as C and C++.
At the time of writing, a significant percentage of mainstream software development
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is done in higher-level, type-safe languages such as Java [35] and C# [11]. Although
some work has been done on analysis techniques to find common bugs in such lan-
guages (e.g., [4, 61]), tools based on these techniques are not widely used in practice.
For this reason, we were interested in finding out what kinds of bugs can be found
in safe object-oriented languages (such as Java) using simple analysis techniques.
By systematically exploring the space of such bugs, we felt we could accomplish
two main objectives. First, we wanted to gain a better understanding of why bugs
occur in the first place. Second, by understanding the low-hanging fruit, we felt we
could help inform research on where more sophisticated analysis techniques could
be applied most profitably.
Our strategy for exploring the space of easily-detectable bugs was bug-driven
research. Starting from examples of bugs in real software, we designed and imple-
mented simple analysis techniques which would find occurrences of similar bugs.
The result of this effort is a static analysis tool called FindBugs [29]. The term
we use for a common, easily-recognizable type of bug is bug pattern [1]. In many
cases, occurrences of bugs patterns may be effectively identified by looking for indi-
rect signs that a defect might be present, without requiring an exhaustive analysis
proving the existence of a defect. Our experience has shown that signs associated
with the occurrence of a bug pattern can often be recognized using simple analysis
techniques, and that detectors for those patterns find a surprising number of real
bugs—hundreds or thousands—in production software artifacts.
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1.5 Contributions
Our research makes the following contributions:
1. We describe many common types of bugs affecting Java programs, reasons why
they occur, and effective static analysis techniques for identifying occurrences.
Several types of bugs we documented were surprising to find in production
software.
2. We describe the implementation FindBugs, a static analysis tool to find bugs
in Java programs.
3. We evaluate FindBugs on real software artifacts, including both production
systems and student programming projects, and show that they find a large
number of real bugs with an acceptable rate of false positives. We also measure
the false negative rate on student programming projects, showing that for some
types of bugs FindBugs finds a significant percentage of all occurrences of those
bugs.
4. We discuss experiences from software projects that have used FindBugs, show-
ing that FindBugs finds serious defects, and has been judged useful enough to
be a regular part of the development process.
9
Chapter 2
Bug Patterns
In this chapter we define the general concept of bug pattern, and discuss general im-
plementation techniques for automatically recognizing occurrences of bug patterns.
2.1 What is a Bug Pattern?
Many bugs in software are subtle, and would require sophisticated analysis to find.
However, a surprising number of bugs in real software are blatant and relatively
obvious, such as the null pointer dereference shown in Figure 1.1.
Some simple mistakes are caught at compile time: for example, the Java source
to bytecode compiler will catch all syntax and static type errors. However, some
bugs (such as the Eclipse null pointer bug) may be thought of as being one step
removed from a syntax error. Many such bugs have characteristics that make them
relatively easy to identify using static analysis. We refer to these bugs informally as
occurrences of bug patterns. We use the term “bug pattern” as a way of emphasizing
that many bugs are caused by similar mistakes, manifest in similar ways, and may
be recognized by looking for the common features they share.
2.1.1 Discovering and Recognizing Bug Patterns
In discussing bug patterns, there are two main questions to answer:
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1. How can bug patterns be discovered?
2. What analysis techniques can find occurrences of bug patterns?
We have addressed both questions by conducting bug-driven research: we find as
many examples of real bugs as possible, determine why they occur, look for easily-
recognizable signs indicating their presence, and then develop analysis techniques
to find occurrences in real software automatically.
Examples of bugs (and thus ideas for bug patterns) come from many sources:
books, articles, student programming projects, bug databases, and our own expe-
rience. Any time a bug is identified in some software artifact is an opportunity to
discover other, similar bugs. From this perspective, bugs in software are valuable
because they can be used to improve the quality of the code in which they occur, and
potentially other software as well. As an analogy, consider the role a vaccine plays
in building a stronger immune system. A vaccine presents neutralized specimens
of a pathogen to the immune system so antibodies can be developed to recognize
and eliminate instances of the pathogen in the future. Similarly, once a software de-
fect has been isolated and neutralized, we can develop a static analysis to recognize
similar defects in the future.
As a platform for our research on easily-detectable software defects, we have
developed a static analysis tool called FindBugs [29]. At the time of writing, we have
implemented detectors for 104 different bug patterns in FindBugs. To implement
these detectors, we have used a wide variety of analysis techniques. In general,
we use the simplest technique that will find and identify some occurrences of the
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pattern in real software without producing too many false positives. Some of the
analysis techniques we use include:
• Inspecting method names, signatures, and inheritance
• Using a sequential scan over bytecode instructions to drive a state machine
recognizer—analogous to peephole optimization
• Intra-procedural dataflow analysis [46]
• Flow-insensitive whole-program analysis
2.1.2 Bugs vs. Style
In discussing the use of automatic tools to check code, it is crucial to distinguish
bug checkers from style checkers. A bug checker uses static analysis to find code
that violates a specific correctness property, and which may cause the program to
misbehave at runtime. A style checker examines code to determine if it contains
violations of particular coding style rules. The key value of enforcing coding style
rules is that when a consistent style is used throughout a project, it makes it easier
for the developers working on the project to understand each other’s code, and to
avoid unintentional deviations from good practice. Some style rules, such as “do not
use fall-through in switch statements”, and “always use braces around the clauses
of an if statement”, may help prevent certain kinds of bugs. However, violations
of those style guidelines are not particularly likely to be bugs. For example, always
putting braces around the clauses of an if statement might only prevent a bug 1
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time out of 100. This is a rule worth following when writing new code, but would
not be a particularly effective way to find bugs in existing code.
Tools that focus mainly on checking style, such as PMD [55] and Check-
Style [10], are widely used. However, bug checkers are not nearly as widely used,
even though they are more likely to direct developers to specific real bugs in their
code. We believe the reason for this disparity is that more work is required to use
the output of bug checkers. Style checkers can be extremely accurate in determining
whether or not code adheres to a particular set of style rules. Therefore, little or
no judgment is needed to interpret their output, and changing code to adhere to
style guidelines has a tangible effect on improving the understandability of the code.
In contrast, bug checkers, especially ones that use unsound analysis, may produce
warnings that are inaccurate or difficult to interpret. In addition, fixing bugs re-
ported by a bug checker requires judgment in order to understand the cause of the
bug and to fix it without introducing new bugs.
Another problem with bug checkers is that the percentage of false warnings
tends to increase over time, as the real bugs are fixed. Techniques for suppressing
false warnings must be used so that developers can concentrate on evaluating and
fixing the real problems identified by the bug checker.
We believe that tools based on simple local analysis represent a useful sweet
spot in the design space for bug checkers, for several reasons. Aside from being
easy to implement, they tend to produce output that is easy for programmers to
understand. Because they focus on finding deviations from accepted practice, they
tend to be very effective at finding real bugs, even though they do not perform deep
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analysis. With tuning, they can achieve an acceptably low rate of false warnings. All
of these factors contribute to overcoming barriers to wider adoption of bug checkers
by developers.
2.2 Catalog of Bug Patterns
In this section, we present an informal taxonomy of bug patterns which we have
observed in real programs and implemented in FindBugs. While this collection of
patterns is by no means exhaustive, it does shed some light on common reasons why
errors occur. Only a brief synopsis of each pattern is presented in this section; for
a more complete description of each pattern, see Appendix A.
2.2.1 Classification
We have classified each bug pattern according to three main criteria: the category
of error, the bug pattern family, and typical causes.
Categories are correctness, multithreaded correctness, performance, and mali-
cious code vulnerability. Correctness is the most general category: these are bugs
whose presence would be a serious problem for any kind of program. The other cat-
egories describe bugs which might apply only in some situations. For example, the
occurrence of a multithreaded correctness pattern can be safely ignored if it occurs
in a program which is single-threaded. Performance bugs may only be significant
when they occur on certain code paths, such as in tight loops.
Often, bug patterns appear in multiple variations which are worth distinguish-
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ing. For example, we have identified two patterns involving suspicious calls to the
equals() method. We refer to these groups of related patterns as a family, which is
designated by a short code. For example, the family code for suspicious equals()
calls is EC, for “Equals Comparison.”
We have broken down typical causes of bugs as follows. Note that in the
summary tables in this chapter we have used abbreviations for these causes. These
abbreviations are given in parentheses after the name of each cause.
Typo (Typo) Many bugs occur because of simple typographical mistakes: for ex-
ample, using the == operator instead of the != operator.
Misunderstood API (API) The runtime library for J2SE 1.5 contains more than
3,700 classes and interfaces defining more than 21,000 public methods (not
counting overridden method variants in subtypes). Each class, interface, and
method has the potential to be used incorrectly.
Misunderstood language feature (Lang) Although Java is a fairly simple and
well-designed language, it has its share of sharp corners.
Misunderstood invariants (Inv) Many mistakes are a result of programmers
failing to understand the invariants of a method or class: for example, as-
suming a parameter will never be null even though callers may pass a null
value.
Novice mistake (Novice) Some errors are often seen in code written by novice
Java programmers.
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Logic error (Logic) This is a catch-all designation for patterns whose root causes
did not always fit one of the other classifications.
2.2.2 Summary and Discussion
Tables 2.1 through 2.5 list the bug patterns currently implemented in FindBugs.
Table 2.6 summarizes the prevalence of the various causes. Although our taxonomy
is informal, and not meant to be a rigorous analysis of why bugs occur, several
interesting patterns do emerge.
Stupid mistakes are very common. Of the 104 patterns FindBugs cur-
rently recognizes, 35 are bugs frequently caused by typos. This is somewhat sur-
prising, since as programmers we generally expect the compiler to find our lexical
and grammatical mistakes. However, a surprising number of typos not only pass the
compiler’s syntax and type checking, but also appear to be correct on casual inspec-
tion. In addition, many of the patterns not explicitly classified as typos are the result
of similar oversights; for example, forgetting to initialize a field in a constructor.
API misuse is very common. Misunderstood or misused APIs are the
single most prevalent cause in the bug patterns we have implemented; 47 of the
104 patterns are classified as API issues. There are two main reasons why this
is so. First, the standard Java runtime library contains an enormous number of
public classes and methods, as we noted earlier. Second, many of these APIs have
surprisingly subtle or even difficult requirements for correct use; these requirements
are not checked by the compiler.
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Family Pattern Common causes
AM Empty jar or zip file entry API, Logic
BC Impossible cast Typo, Novice, Logic
BIT Incompatible bit masks Logic, Typo
BRSA Bad ResultSet access API
CN Class implements Cloneable, but does not implement clone() API
CN Clone method does not call super.clone() API
Co Covariant compareTo() method API
DE Dropped exception Logic, API
DLS Dead local store Logic, Typo
DMI Passing invalid constant value for a month API
Dm Method calls runFinalizersOnExit() API
EC Invoking equals() on an array object API
EC Calling equals() on unrelated types Logic, API
Eq Covariant equals() method API
FE Equality comparison of floating point values Lang
FI Explicit invocation of finalizer Lang
FI Finalizer does not call super.finalize() Lang
HE Equal objects should have equal hashcodes API
ICAST Invalid integer shift Logic, Typo
ICAST Integer division result cast to double Logic, Lang
ICAST Integer value cast to double, then passed to Math.ceil() Logic, Lang
IL A container is added to itself Logic, Typo
IL Infinite recursive loop Typo
IM Integer multiplication of result of integer remainder Typo, Lang
IMSE Dubious catching of IllegalMonitorStateException Novice
IP A parameter is dead upon entry to method but overwritten Typo, Novice
It Iterator next() method can’t throw NoSuchElementException API
J2EE Store of non serializable object into HttpSession API
NP Null pointer dereference in method Typo, Logic, Inv
NP Possible null pointer dereference in method Typo, Logic, Inv
NP equals() method does not check for null parameter API
NP Immediate dereference of the result of readLine() API
NP Passing null for unconditionally dereferenced parameter Inv
NP Read of unwritten field Typo
NS Questionable use of non-short-circuit logic Typo
Nm Class defines equal(), not equals() Typo
Nm Confusing method names Typo
Nm Class defines hashcode(), not hashCode() Typo
Nm Class defines tostring(), not toString() Typo
ODR Method may fail to close database resource Logic
OS Method may fail to close stream Logic
QF Complicated, subtle or wrong increment in for-loop Typo
RC Suspicious reference comparison Lang, API
RCN Redundant comparison of non-null value to null Inv, Logic
RCN Redundant comparison of two null values Inv, Logic
RCN Nullcheck of value previously dereferenced Inv, Logic
RE Invalid syntax for regular expression Typo, Novice, API
RR Method ignores results of InputStream.read() API
Table 2.1: Correctness patterns
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Family Pattern Common causes
RR Method ignores results of InputStream.skip() API
RV Random value from 0 to 1 coerced to 0 API, Novice
RV Checking if result of String.indexOf() is positive API, Typo
RV Discarding result of readLine() after checking if it is nonnull Novice, API
RV Method ignores return value API, Novice
SA Self assignment of field Typo
Se Instance field in serializable class not serializable API, Inv
Se serialVersionUID declared incorrectly Typo, API
Se Parent of Serializable class has no void constructor API
Se Externalizable class has no void constructor API
SnVI Class is Serializable, but doesn’t define serialVersionUID API
UCF Useless control flow Typo
UR Uninitialized read of field in constructor Logic, Typo
UwF Field only ever set to null Logic
Table 2.2: Correctness patterns (continued)
Family Pattern Common causes
DC Double check of field Lang
Dm Monitor wait() called on Condition Typo, API
Dm A thread was created using the default empty run method Logic
IS2 Inconsistent synchronization Logic
JLM Synchronization performed on java.util.concurrent Lock Typo, API
LI Lazy initialization of static field Lang, Logic
ML Method synchronizes on an updated field Typo, Lang
MWN Mismatched notify() Typo, Novice, API
MWN Mismatched wait() Typo, Novice, API
NN Naked notify in method Logic, Lang, API
No Using notify() rather than notifyAll() in method Logic, Lang
RS Class’s readObject() method is synchronized API, Logic
Ru Invoking run() on a thread API, Typo
SC Constructor invokes Thread.start() Logic, Lang
SP Method spins on field Novice, Lang
SWL Method calls Thread.sleep() with a lock held Logic
TLW Wait with two locks held Logic
UG Unsynchronized get method, synchronized set method Lang, Logic, Typo
Table 2.3: Multithreaded correctness patterns
Family Pattern Common causes
EI Returning reference to mutable object Logic
EI2 Incorporating reference to mutable object Logic
FI Finalizer should be protected, not public API
MS Storing mutable object into static field Logic
MS Static field could be modified by untrusted code Logic, Typo
MS Returning mutable array Logic
MS Field is a mutable array Logic
MS Field is a mutable Hashtable Logic
Table 2.4: Malicious code patterns
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Family Pattern Common causes
Dm Method invokes dubious Boolean constructor API
Dm Method allocates a boxed primitive just to call toString() API
Dm Explicit garbage collection API
Dm Method allocates an object, only to get the class object Lang, API
Dm Calling Random.nextDouble() to generate a random integer API
Dm Invoking dubious new String(String) constructor API
Dm Method invokes toString() method on a String API
Dm Method invokes dubious new String() constructor API
FI Empty finalizer method Lang
FI Finalizer does nothing but call superclass finalizer Lang
ITA Method uses toArray() with zero-length array argument API
SBSC Method concatenates strings using + in a loop API, Lang
SIC Inner class should be made static Lang, Typo
SS Unread final instance field Typo
UrF Unread field Typo, Logic
UuF Unused field Typo, Logic
Table 2.5: Performance patterns
Category API Lang Inv Typo Logic Novice
Correctness 29 7 7 23 19 7
Multithreaded Correctness 7 8 0 7 10 3
Malicious Code 1 0 0 1 7 0
Performance 10 5 0 4 2 0
All 47 20 7 35 38 10
Table 2.6: Summary of bug pattern causes by category and overall
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Java mixes several programming paradigms. Perhaps more than any
other mainstream language (other than scripting languages), the Java language and
its runtime library freely mix several different programming paradigms. Although
nominally object-oriented, Java is not a pure object-based language, which can be
seen in features such as primitive types (which are not objects) and static methods.
Classes such as String and Integer are immutable, and employ a nearly-functional
style of programming: however, they cannot be compared by value using the stan-
dard comparison operators. This inconsistency can cause real problems for pro-
grammers, especially novice programmers. The “Method ignores return value” and
“Suspicious Reference Comparison” patterns are good examples of the confusion
caused by mixed programming paradigms.
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Chapter 3
Selected Bug Patterns and Implementation Techniques
In this section we describe in detail some of the bug patterns for which we have im-
plemented detectors in FindBugs. The patterns we have selected for this chapter are
those which are especially likely to represent serious errors, are subtle or surprising,
or for which we have developed a novel analysis technique.
All of the patterns and implementation techniques we describe here are realized
in FindBugs [29], a static analysis tool to find bugs in Java programs. FindBugs
works by analyzing Java class files [50] at the bytecode level. Java bytecode is
semantically quite close to Java source code, and by making use of source line
number tables found in Java class files, the results of analyzing bytecode can be
easily mapped back to source code.
3.1 Covariant Equals
Java classes may override the equals(Object) method to define a predicate for
object equality. This method is used by many of the Java runtime library classes;
for example, to implement generic containers.
Programmers sometimes mistakenly use the type of their class Foo as the type
of the parameter to equals():
public boolean equals(Foo obj) {...}
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class Count {
int value;
public Count(int value) {
this.value = value;
}
public boolean equals(Count other) {
return other != null && this.value == other.value;
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
Count c1 = new Count(42);
Count c2 = new Count(42);
Object obj = c2;
System.out.println(c1.equals(c2)); // prints "true"
System.out.println(c1.equals(obj)); // prints "false"
System.out.println(obj.equals(c1)); // prints "false"
}
}
Figure 3.1: Example of a class with a covariant equals method
This covariant version of equals() does not override the version in the Object
class, which may lead to unexpected behavior at runtime, especially if the class
is used with one of the standard collection classes which expect that the standard
equals(Object) method is overridden.
This kind of bug is insidious because the code appears to be correct, and will
work correctly in some situations. For example, Figure 3.1 shows an example of a
class, Count, defining a covariant equals()method. The method is only called when
both the receiver object and the object passed as the argument have the compile-
time type Count. If either the receiver or argument has the superclass type Object,
then the default equals() method will be called. Since the default implementation
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compares reference equality, it is likely to yield different results than the covariant
equals(). Thus, the first time an instance of a class defining a covariant equals()
method is used in a generic container or other context where equals(Object) might
be called, the program will quietly perform the wrong computation. Because this
kind of error does not generally result in obvious misbehavior, such as a runtime
exception, it may elude testing.
Detecting instances of this bug pattern using static analysis simply involves
examining the method signatures of a class and its superclasses to see if the class
only defines or inherits a covariant version of the equals() method.
3.2 Equal Objects Must Have Equal Hash Codes
In order for Java objects to be stored in hash data structures, such as HashMap and
HashSet objects, they must implement both the equals(Object) and hashCode()
methods. Objects which compare as equal must have the same hashcode.
Consider a case where a class overrides equals() but not hashCode(). The
default implementation of hashCode() in the Object class (which is the ancestor of
all Java classes) returns an arbitrary value assigned by the virtual machine. Thus,
it is possible for objects of this class to be equal without having the same hashcode.
Because these objects would likely hash to different buckets, it would be possible to
have two equal objects in the same hash data structure, which violates the semantics
of HashMap and HashSet.
As with covariant equals, this kind of bug is hard to spot through inspection.
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There is nothing to “see”; the mistake lies in what is missing. Because the equals()
method is useful independently of hashCode(), it can be difficult for novice Java pro-
grammers to understand why they must be defined in a coordinated manner. This
illustrates the important role tools can play in educating programmers about subtle
language and API semantics issues. (We will return to this issue in Section 4.5.1.)
Automatically verifying that a given class maintains the invariant that equal
objects have equal hashcodes would be very difficult, and is undecidable in general.
Our approach is to check for the easy cases, such as
• Classes which redefine equals(Object) but inherit the default implementa-
tion of hashCode()
• Classes which redefine hashCode() but do not redefine equals(Object)
Checking for these cases requires simple inspection of method names and sig-
natures and the inheritance hierarchy.
3.3 Null Pointer Dereference and Redundant Comparison to Null
Exceptions due to dereferencing a null pointer are a very common type of error in
Java programs. Some null pointer bugs arise because of null values loaded from
the heap or passed from a distant call site: such bugs would require sophisticated
analysis to find. However, our experience studying production Java applications and
libraries has shown that many null pointer bugs are the result of simple mistakes,
such as using the wrong boolean operator. An example of a simple null pointer bug
is shown in Figure 3.2. The programmer clearly meant to use the && operator, and
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// javax/xml/soap/SOAPPart.java, line 38
public String getContentId()
{
String[] header = getMimeHeader("Content-Id");
String id = null;
if( header != null || header.length > 0 )
id = header[0];
return id;
}
Figure 3.2: An obvious null pointer dereference in JBoss 4.0.0RC1
not the || operator, before taking the length of the array header. In our work, we
have found that simple coding errors like this one are surprisingly common, even in
production code.
In this section, we describe the analysis used in FindBugs to determine where
null pointer dereferences might occur. The design of this analysis illustrates some
interesting examples of trade-offs needed to find real bugs without producing too
many false warnings.
3.3.1 Scope
One of the main problems in static analysis is determining which paths through the
program are feasible. Even analyzing the possible control flow of a single method
is extremely difficult, since the runtime behavior of the method depends on the
behavior of called methods and values stored in heap objects. To construct an
analysis useful for finding bugs, we must ensure that the issues we report are likely
to represent real problems.
Since our null pointer analysis focuses on finding bugs resulting from simple
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mistakes, we have chosen not to worry about bugs with complex preconditions.
Instead, we have adopted a very simple set of criteria for which bugs to report:
1. All null pointer dereferences guaranteed to occur if full statement coverage is
achieved are reported as high priority warnings.
2. All null pointer dereferences guaranteed to occur if full branch coverage is
achieved are reported as medium priority warnings.
These criteria rely on an implicit specification: that each statement and branch in
a program should serve a useful purpose. Programmers generally do not introduce
unreachable code or infeasible branches intentionally1. If executing any single state-
ment or taking any single branch is guaranteed to cause a null pointer exception, it
is a strong indication that the code contains a logic error.
In general, our analysis reports exactly the pointer dereferences described by
these criteria, with some additional restrictions designed to reduce false positives
due to infeasible exception control flow. The details of the null pointer analysis are
described in the remainder of this section.
3.3.2 The Basic Analysis
The null pointer analysis is a forward intra-procedural dataflow analysis performed
on a control-flow graph representation of a Java method. The dataflow values are
1Assertions are an exception to this rule, since they may add infeasible control flow intended
to guard against incorrect code changes in the future. A static analysis may consider assertions to
be a special case, and avoid reporting bugs having to do with code reached when an assertion is
triggered.
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Figure 3.3: Meet-semilattice for dataflow values used in null pointer analysis
Java stack frames containing “slots” representing method parameters, local vari-
ables, and stack operands. Each slot contains a single symbolic value indicating
whether the value contained in the slot is definitely null, definitely not null, or pos-
sibly null. The meet-semilattice of symbolic values is shown in Figure 3.3, and the
meaning of each value is described in Table 3.1.
3.3.3 Modeling Values
On method entry, parameter values are assumed to be NCP, Null on a Complex
Path. This is a conservative assumption reflecting the fact that the analysis has
no a priori justification to assume that parameters are either null or non-null. An
exception is the reference to the receiver object (this), which is set to NonNull in
instance methods.
Statements are modeled as shown in Table 3.2. In this table, p refers to the
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Warning if ...
Compared
Value Meaning Dereferenced to null
Null Value definitely null High Medium†
Checked Null Value null due to comparison High Medium†
Null-E Value null on exception path Medium Medium†
NonNull Value definitely non-null — Medium†
Checked NonNull Value non-null due to comparison — Medium†
No Kaboom NonNull Value non-null because it was dereferenced — High
NSP Null on Simple Path Medium —
NSP-E Null on Simple Path due to exception Low —
NCP Null on Complex Path — —
†Low priority if the check does not create dead code.
Table 3.1: Symbolic values used in the null pointer analysis
Statement Value of p
p = null Null
p = this NonNull
p = new ... NonNull
p = "string" NonNull
p = Foo.class NonNull
p = q.x NCP
p = a[i] NCP
p = f() NCP
Table 3.2: Modeling statements in the null pointer analysis
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value computed by an expression—in other words, the value that results by executing
a statement. q refers to an arbitrary object reference, a refers to an arbitrary
array reference, and Foo refers to an arbitrary class. In general, the analysis treats
unknown values as NCP (Null on Complex Path) unless they are definitely null or
definitely non-null.
3.3.4 Control Flow
Values may become non-null by being dereferenced. If a dereference instruction
(such as an instance method call or field access) does not throw a null pointer
exception, then we know that the value was not null. One useful fact to keep track
of following a successful dereference was whether or not the value was definitely non-
null before the dereference. If it was potentially null (NSP or NCP), we represent it
with a special “No Kaboom” non-null value, to reflect the fact that a null pointer
exception could have been thrown, but was not.
Note that a dereference of a value known to be Null does not produce a No
Kaboom value; because a null pointer exception is guaranteed, the analysis knows
the non-exception edge leading from the dereference is infeasible, and sets the stack
frame on that edge to a special “Top” value marking it as dead.
Control joins are modeled in the usual way, by taking the meet in the lattice
of the values in corresponding slots. Where possible, branches on comparisons to
null are used to gain information about the tested value: we use the direction of
the resulting branch to make the value either Null or NonNull on the appropriate
control edge.
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class Foo implements Cloneable {
HashSet contents;
...
public Object clone() {
Foo dup = null;
try {
dup = super.clone();
} catch (CloneNotSupportedException e) {
// Can’t happen
}
// Make deep copy of contents
dup.contents = (HashSet)dup.contents.clone();
return dup;
}
}
Figure 3.4: An infeasible exception handler
Exception paths are handled specially. On entry to an exception handler, all
Null values are replaced with Null-E, and all NSP values are replaced with NSP-E.
We maintain this distinction because it is common for some call sites targeting meth-
ods declaring a checked exception to know a priori that the checked exception can-
not occur. A typical example involving an infeasible CloneNotSupportedException
handler is shown in Figure 3.4. By keeping track of values which are only null on an
exception path, we can lower the precedence of warnings emitted for dereferences of
such values.
3.3.5 Value Numbering
Java bytecode is stack-based, rather than register-based. Unlike register-based code,
most Java bytecode instructions consume values by popping them from the stack,
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and produce results by pushing new values onto the stack. As a result, a reference
to the same object may be on the stack several times simultaneously. Whenever we
encounter an instruction which gains information about one instance of a duplicated
value (usually the top value on the stack), we must ensure that the information
is propagated to all other copies of the value in the stack frame. Examples of
instructions where this is necessary include dereferences and null comparisons.
FindBugs implements a dataflow analysis to assign each local variable and
stack operand a value number. Values with the same value number are guaranteed
to be the same at runtime. Therefore, when we encounter an instruction that gains
information about whether or not a value is null, such as ifnull, we propagate that
information to all other local variables and stack operands sharing the same value
number.
3.3.6 Infeasible Paths
As noted earlier, infeasible paths are a common source of inaccuracy in static anal-
ysis. In the context of an analysis to find null pointer dereferences, the problem is
determining when a condition implies that a value will be guaranteed to be null or
non-null.
Often, a dereference of a possibly-null value v will be guarded by an explicit
comparison of v to null, with the dereference occurring only when v is not null.
In such cases, it is easy for the analysis to determine that the dereference of v
is protected. A more difficult analysis problem arises when some other condition
b guards the dereference of v. If b implies v 6= null then the dereference of v is
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safe. An example of an indirect null check is shown in Figure 3.5. A na¨ıve analysis
might assume that p could be null at the call to p.f(), resulting in a false warning.
However, that is only possible on the infeasible path 2→ 3.
Unfortunately, determining which conditions entail a guarantee that a value is
or is not null is a difficult problem (and is undecidable in general). In some cases, the
condition checked may originate from outside the scope of the current analysis (such
as a parameter passed into the method). Rather than trying to use a sophisticated
analysis to untangle the meaning of conditions, we simply assume that all conditions
are opaque null checks. This is accomplished by changing all NSP (Null on a Simple
Path) values to NCP (Null on a Complex Path) on branches.
Because no warnings are reported when NCP values are dereferenced, this
technique misses some real bugs. However, it ensures that a very high percentage of
warnings that are reported do correspond to real errors. If it is possible to achieve full
branch coverage in a method, then every dereference of a NSP is a real, exploitable
bug. In the future we may augment the analysis to be smarter about inferring the
effects of conditions which are not direct null checks. (For one approach to efficient
and precise analysis of program states implied by boolean conditions, see [15].)
3.3.7 Redundant Comparisons
Interestingly, a significant number of null comparisons occurring in real programs are
redundant, because the value compared to null is either definitely null or definitely
non-null. Sometimes, this is because of defensive programming. A less benign cause
of redundant comparisons is that a value was unconditionally dereferenced, and
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Figure 3.5: Example of an indirect null check
checked against null afterward. This often indicates a real error: if the value really
can be null, the comparison should certainly be done before the dereference. (For a
general account of using redundant code to find bugs, see [67].)
FindBugs reports a high priority warning for all comparisons of No-Kaboom
to null, since this strongly suggests that the value really can be null at the earlier
location where it is dereferenced. Other redundant comparisons are considerably
less likely to represent real bugs. We use a simple heuristic to determine which of
the remaining cases is likely to be worth reporting: if the infeasible branch of a
redundant comparison creates a nonempty region of dead code, then we report a
medium priority warning. Consider the following code fragment:
p = new Object();
q = new Object();
...
if (p != null) { // a defensive null check
x = p.hashCode();
}
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if (q != null) { // a probable logic error
y = q.hashCode();
} else {
doSomethingElse();
}
Both null comparisons are redundant, since neither p nor q can be non-null. The
comparison p != null is simply defensive, because it does not cause any dead
code. The comparison q != null, on the other hand, is more likely to indicate
programmer confusion: the existence of executable code in the unreachable else
block suggests a logic error.
In any case, it is important to ensure that the dead code resulting from redun-
dant comparisons does not pollute the results of the analysis. Our analysis marks
the frame on the infeasible branch of a redundant comparison as a special “Top”
value, which serves as the meet identity element. This effectively makes the dead
code invisible to the analysis. In the previous example, this would ensure that p
and q retain the value NonNull, even after their respective null checks.
3.3.8 Assertions
Another form of infeasible control flow which must be considered in a null pointer
analysis is exceptions due to failed assertions. Generally, an assertion in Java is a
method which takes a boolean argument and throws an exception if the argument
is false:
// throws exception if p null:
checkAssertion(p != null);
p.f(); // safe
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We handle these kinds of assertions by simply changing any Null or NSP values
to NCP following a call to a method containing the substring “abort”, “assert”,
“check”, “error”, or “failed.”
Another form of assertion is a method which throws an exception uncondi-
tionally:
if (p == null)
error("p is null"); // throws exception
p.f(); // safe
We handle these cases using a simple inter-procedural analysis which identifies meth-
ods that throw an exception unconditionally, and at each call site, removing the
control edge representing a normal return from those methods.
3.3.9 Finally Blocks
A finally block in Java is a region of code associated with a try statement which
is guaranteed to be executed no matter how control leaves the try block. The Java
source to bytecode compiler will emit code for a finally block either by duplicating
it in the generated bytecode, or by emitting a jsr subroutine. Two issues arise
regarding finally blocks.
The first issue is how to represent jsr subroutines in the control flow graph.
For FindBugs, we decided to inline them into their call sites. This makes jsr and
ret instructions used to call and return from jsr subroutines behave like goto in-
structions as far as the dataflow analysis is concerned. While this could theoretically
result in an exponential increase in the size of the resulting control flow graph, we
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have not observed this in practice.
The second issue is how to handle warnings for code inside finally blocks.
For most kinds of warnings, including null pointer dereferences, as long as the warn-
ing describes a bug feasible for at least one expansion of the block, the warning is
valid. However, redundant comparison warnings are only valid if the comparison is
redundant for every expansion, and is always redundant for the same reason. If the
source to bytecode compiler has emitted as a jsr subroutine, it is easy to detect
the duplication, since each expansion of the subroutine shares the same range of
bytecode instructions. However, if the compiler has duplicated the code, the situa-
tion is slightly more difficult to detect. In that case, we use the method source line
number table to keep track of duplicated code, and only emit redundant comparison
warnings if all redundant comparisons for a particular line are in agreement.
3.3.10 Extending the Basic Analysis
In this section, we discuss simple inter-procedural extensions to our basic null pointer
analysis.
Unconditionally Dereferenced Parameters
One common source of null pointer errors we have observed in real programs is
confusion about whether method parameters may be null. A sure sign that the
programmer believes a parameter should be non-null is that it is dereferenced un-
conditionally. If a caller ever passes a null value for such a parameter, a null pointer
exception is guaranteed.
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To find methods which unconditionally dereference a parameter, we perform a
backward dataflow analysis to compute the set of parameter values guaranteed to be
dereferenced on all forward paths. The set at the entry of the method’s control flow
graph is the set of unconditionally dereferenced parameters. The analysis excludes
runtime exception control edges from consideration, unless they are thrown via an
explicit throw statement. To see why it is necessary to exclude “implicit” runtime
exceptions, consider the following method:
boolean sameHashCode(Object p, Object q) {
return p.hashCode() == q.hashCode();
}
Although it is possible for the call to p.hashCode() to throw a null pointer exception
which bypasses the call to q.hashCode(), that behavior is not part of the expected
behavior of the method. So, our analysis would consider both parameters of this
method to be dereferenced unconditionally.
Once we have computed the set of methods which unconditionally dereference
a parameter, we examine all call sites to find places where a possibly-null value
(Null or NSP in the lattice) is passed to a method which might unconditionally
dereference it. An obvious difficulty in Java is determining which methods might
be called at polymorphic call sites. Our analysis conservatively assumes that unless
the type of the receiver object is known exactly it could be any concrete subtype.
Some methods, such as Object.equals(), have a large number of potential target
methods, and could therefore generate a large number of false warnings. To reduce
the effect of these false positives, we issue a high or medium priority warning only
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Annotation Context How checked
@NonNull Parameter Callers must not pass Null or NSP
Return value Method must not return Null or NSP
@PossiblyNull Parameter Method must not dereference unconditionally
Return value Callers must not dereference unconditionally
Table 3.3: Supported annotations for method parameters and return values
for cases where there is a single known target, or when all known targets dereference
the parameter unconditionally.
Parameter and Return Value Annotations
A recurring issue in program analysis to find bugs is trying to deduce the expected
behavior of some piece of code. In null pointer analysis, it is often unclear where the
blame lies when an inconsistency is detected. For example, when an unconditional
parameter dereference results in a null pointer exception, should we blame the caller
or the callee?
Specifications are a simple way for the programmer to make the job of the
analysis easier by explicitly marking which values must not be null and which may
be null. (LCLint [25] and CQual [31] are other examples of static analysis tools that
leverage lightweight annotations to find bugs.) Our analysis can use two kinds of
specifications on method parameters and return values: @NonNull, which indicates
that a value must not be null, and @PossiblyNull, which indicates that a value
might be null. These specifications are conveyed using Java source annotations [42].
Table 3.3 lists a summary of how these annotations are checked.
@NonNull and @PossiblyNull annotations are inherited by subclasses. They
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may be relaxed by subclasses (for example, by changing a @NonNull annotation
to @PossiblyNull on a parameter), but not strengthened. Because annotations
are a contract applying to all subclasses, they do not suffer imprecision due to
the difficulty of resolving target methods at polymorphic call sites. However, they
do impose an additional restriction on method callers not to pass a null value or
unconditionally dereference a return value, even when they know that to be safe
in the calling context. The is a potential source of false warnings. The results of
using specifications in student programming projects, including a discussion of false
warning rates, are discussed in Chapter 5.
3.4 Wrong Type in Equals Comparison
The contract for the equals(Object) method requires that it return false if the
object passed to it has a different runtime type than that of the receiver object. For
this reason, any call to equals() which passes an object of a type which cannot
possibly match the type of the receiver object is a probable bug, for one of the
following reasons:
1. The caller passed the wrong object
2. The class defining the equals()method called is implemented incorrectly, and
may return true for objects of different runtime types
The detector for this pattern is based on a forward dataflow analysis to infer the
types of all values of parameters, local variables, and stack operands at each location
in an analyzed method. This analysis is similar to the algorithm for verification of
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Java class files described in the Java Virtual Machine Specification [50]. The values
generated by the analysis represent an upper bound on the real runtime types: the
actual runtime type of a value may be a subtype of the type inferred by the analysis.
Two kinds of warnings may be produced for a call to equals() using receiver type
A and argument type B.
If both A and B are class types, FindBugs generates a warning if neither
A ⊆ B nor B ⊆ A. Because Java classes use single inheritance, this implies that the
objects compared by the call to equals() cannot possibly have the same runtime
type.
If either A and B are interface types, then the detector computes the inter-
section of all known subtypes of A and B. If no concrete classes are found in the
intersection, the detector issues a warning. Note that checking for the existence of
subtypes is sound only if FindBugs is aware of all classes that might be available at
runtime. Due to language features such as dynamic class loading, this is not always
a valid assumption. However, as long as FindBugs has access to the complete class
hierarchy that will be used at runtime, this is a reasonable assumption to make.
3.5 Infinite Recursive Loop
Consider the code in Figure 3.6, which is taken from a student programming assign-
ment. The student was obviously confused about the distinction between allocating
a new instance of a class using the new operator and initializing a new instance in
a constructor. At runtime, this code will enter an infinite recursive loop.
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class WebSpider {
/** Construct a new WebSpider */
public WebSpider(boolean isDFS, int limit) {
WebSpider spider = new WebSpider(isDFS, limit);
}
...
}
Figure 3.6: An infinite recursive loop in a student programming project
It is easy to understand why a novice programmer would make this particular
mistake. However, could errors like this occur in production code? On the surface,
it seems unlikely. No experienced programmer would confuse object allocation and
initialization, and any test suite achieving 100% method coverage would be guaran-
teed to find problems like this one. However, bugs of this type can and do occur in
production software. They can occur for several reasons, including:
• Confusing a method with an identically-named field (Figure 3.7)
• Casting a method argument with the intention of dispatching to an overloaded
method which does not actually exist (Figure 3.8)
• Failure to delegate, either to another object or to a superclass method (Fig-
ure 3.9)
The detector for this bug pattern works by looking for recursive calls which
either
1. postdominate the entry point of the method, or
2. pass the method parameters as arguments to a recursive call without first
reading and writing at least one field
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// In java.lang.annotation.AnnotationTypeMismatchException
private final String foundType;
...
public String foundType() {
return this.foundType();
}
Figure 3.7: Infinite recursive loop in J2SE version 1.5.0 due to confusing identically-
named field and method
// In org.jboss.util.MuInteger, line 229
public int compareTo(int other) {
return (value < other) ? -1 : (value == other) ? 0 : 1;
}
...
public int compareTo(Object obj) {
return compareTo((MuInteger)obj); // meant to call compareTo(int)?
}
Figure 3.8: Infinite recursive loop in JBoss 4.0.2 due to an attempt to dispatch to
an nonexistent overloaded method variant
// In org.eclipse.pde.internal.core.plugin.Extensions
// line 27
void load(Extensions srcPluginBase) {
range= srcPluginBase.range;
super.load(srcPluginBase); // delegation
valid = hasRequiredAttributes();
}
public void load(IPluginBase srcPluginBase) {
this.load(srcPluginBase); // failure to delegate?
}
Figure 3.9: Infinite recursive loop in Eclipse 3.0 due to failure to delegate
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One difficulty in detecting this pattern is determining when the caller and
callee are really the same method. For non-virtual method calls, this is simple,
since there is only one possible target. For virtual method calls, we issue a warning
only in the following cases, where we have high confidence that the call is recursive:
• the callee is known to have the same runtime type as the caller, or
• the caller and callee are dispatched to the same object
Note that the latter condition does not strictly guarantee that the call is recur-
sive, since the object might be an instance of a subclass which overrides the caller.
However, we doubt that this case could arise in any competently written program.
3.6 Bad Cast
One of the fundamental techniques used in object-oriented programming is the cre-
ation of class hierarchies, in which many separate implementations of some base
class or interface exist simultaneously. As long as the methods defined by the base
class are sufficiently general, most clients will be able to operate on instances with-
out needing to know their exact subtype. However, in some cases it is necessary for
clients to dynamically convert a reference from a base class to a subclass by means of
a downcast. Such casts are checked at runtime, and throw a ClassCastException
if the object is not an instance of the subclass named by the cast.
While the Java source to bytecode compiler prevents some infeasible casts, it
allows others to slip through. One type of infeasible downcast not caught by the
compiler may happen as the result of an instanceof check. The check proves that
43
// In java.awt.Font.initializeFont(Hashtable)
obj = attributes.get(TextAttribute.WIDTH);
if (obj instanceof Integer) {
width = ((Float)obj).floatValue();
Figure 3.10: An infeasible downcast in the released version of the J2SE 1.5.0 runtime
library
the tested value is an instance of the named class (or a subclass). However, the
compile-time type of the checked variable is not changed, allowing the value to be
cast to a provably unrelated type. While we have seen this kind of error occur most
often in student programming projects, it can also occur in production software. An
example occurring in the released version of the J2SE 1.5.0 core runtime library is
shown in Figure 3.10.
The detector for this pattern looks for the following types of errors:
• Infeasible casts
• Infeasible instanceof checks
• Upcasts (casts to a supertype)
• Casts of a reference to generic collection interface (e.g., Map or Set) to an
abstract or concrete collection
The first two items (infeasible casts and instanceof checks) are almost certainly
unintentional and may indicate a serious logic error.
The last two items do not necessarily indicate an error, but often indicate
a novice programming mistake. An upcast (cast to a supertype) serves no useful
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/**
* Create a new WebPage
*
* @param u -
* the URL of this WebPage
*/
public WebPage(URL u) {
Object obj = (Object)u;
this.webpage = (WebPage)obj;
this.visited = false;
}
Figure 3.11: An infeasible dynamic cast in a student programming project
purpose, since an instance of a subtype can always be used in any context where
a supertype is expected. We have sometimes observed students casting a reference
to the base Object type in order to silence the compiler error which would result
from a subsequent cast to an unrelated type. An example is shown in figure 3.11.
Casts to abstract or concrete collection classes represent another novice programmer
mistake we have observed in student code. Such casts are at best unnecessary, since
the collection interface classes contain all of the methods required to operate on
instances of collections, and are prone to failing if attempted on a collection object
of an unexpected type.
Like the detector for suspicious equals() comparisons, the detector for bad
casts uses dataflow analysis to compute types for local variables and stack operands.
Where appropriate, successful instanceof checks are used to make the checked
type more precise. Determining which instanceof and checkcast instructions are
guaranteed to either fail or succeed at runtime involves checking the class hierarchy.
For example, a checkcast instruction is guaranteed to fail if neither class is a
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subtype of the other. Making this determination requires inspection of the class
hierarchy. We assume that all classes which could be used at runtime will be available
when the static analysis is performed. Although this is not a sound assumption, it
is reasonable in most cases.
3.7 Read Return Should Be Checked
The java.io.InputStream class has two read()methods which read multiple bytes
into a buffer. Because the number of bytes requested may be greater than the
number of bytes available, these methods return an integer value indicating how
many bytes were actually read.
Programmers sometimes incorrectly assume that these methods always return
the requested number of bytes. However, some input streams (e.g., sockets) can
return short reads. If the return value from read() is ignored, the program may
read uninitialized or stale values from the buffer and also lose its place in the input
stream.
One way to implement this detector would be to use dataflow analysis to
determine whether or not the location where the return value of a call to read()
is stored is ever used by another instruction. However, a simpler analysis technique
works well in practice. The detector for this bug pattern is implemented as a simple
linear scan over the bytecode. If a call to a read() method taking a byte array is
followed immediately by a POP bytecode, we emit a warning. As a refinement, if
a call to InputStream.available() (or one of several other methods which check
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// GNU Classpath 0.15
// java/util/SimpleTimeZone.java, line 1012
int length = input.readInt();
byte[] byteArray = new byte[length];
input.read(byteArray, 0, length);
if (length >= 4)
{
...
Figure 3.12: An example of ignored read return value
the availability of data in the input stream) is seen, we inhibit the emission of any
warnings for the next 70 instructions2. This eliminates some false positives where
the caller knows that the input stream has a certain amount of data available.
In addition to finding calls to read() where the return value is ignored, the
detector also finds calls to skip() where the return value is ignored. Much like
read(), skip() is not guaranteed to skip the exact number of bytes requested.
An example of a bug found by this detector is shown in Figure 3.12. This
code occurs in the class’s readObject() method, which deserializes an instance of
the object from a stream. In the example, the number of bytes read is not checked.
If the call returns fewer bytes than requested, the object will not be deserialized
correctly, and the stream will be out of sync (preventing other objects from being
deserialized).
2We arrived the value 70 by analyzing the classes in Sun’s core Java libraries; there was only a
single instance of a call to read() more than 70 instructions past a call to a method which checks
the availability of input data.
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3.8 Return Value Should Be Checked
This bug pattern is a generalization of the Read Return Should Be Checked pattern.
The standard Java libraries define a number of methods whose return value must
be checked to be used correctly.
A common form of this pattern is calling a method on an immutable object
without checking the result value. For example, once constructed, Java String
objects do not change value. Methods that transform a String value do so by
returning a new object. This is often a source of confusion for programmers used to
other languages (such as C++) where string objects are mutable, leading to mistakes
where the return value of a method call on an immutable object is ignored.
The implementation of the detector for this bug pattern is very similar to that
of the Read Return detector. We look for calls to any memory of a certain set of
methods followed immediately by POP or POP2 bytecodes. The set of methods we
look for includes
• Any String method returning a String
• StringBuffer.toString()
• Any method of InetAddress, BigInteger, or BigDecimal
• MessageDigest.digest(byte[])
• The constructor for any subclass of Thread or Throwable.
This detector is a good example of how bug checkers can help dispel common
misconceptions about API semantics.
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3.9 Double Checked Locking
Lazy initialization is a common performance optimization used to create singleton
objects only as they are needed. In a multithreaded program, some form of syn-
chronization is needed to ensure that the singleton object is created only once, and
that the object is always fully initialized before it is used.
A common idiom for lazy initialization of singleton objects is double checked
locking. Synchronization is performed only if the object has not yet been created,
as shown in the following example:
static SomeClass field;
static SomeClass createSingleton() {
if (field == null) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (field == null) {
SomeClass obj = new SomeClass();
// ...initialize obj...
field = obj;
}
}
}
return field;
}
The intent of double checked locking is that the overhead of lock acquisition is only
incurred if the singleton object is observed as not having been created yet.
Unfortunately, this form of double checked locking is not correct [56]. Although
the idiom guarantees that the object is created only once, the Java memory model
does not guarantee that the threads that see a non-null field value but do not
acquire the lock will see all of the writes used to initialize the object. For example,
the JIT compiler may inline the call to the constructor and reorder some of the
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writes initializing the object so that they occur after the write to the field storing
the object instance.
Double checked locking is a good illustration of the gulf between how one
might think multithreaded code should behave and the behaviors actually allowed
by the language. Most programmers can easily understand how synchronization can
be used to guarantee the atomicity of a sequence of operations. However, it is much
harder to understand the subtle interaction of compiler and processor optimizations.
Memory model issues are challenging even for experts. Double checked locking has
been advocated in a number of books and articles, showing that even experts do
not always understand the consequences of omitting proper synchronization.
Under the revised Java Memory Model [40], it is possible to fix instances of
double checked locking by making the field volatile. The volatile qualifier causes the
compiler to insert the necessary optimization and memory barriers needed to ensure
that all threads will see a completely initialized object, even if they do not acquire
the lock.
Our detector for this bug pattern looks for sequences of bytecode contain-
ing an ifnull instruction, followed by a monitorenter instruction, followed by
another ifnull, with some small number of intermediate instructions occurring
between these sentinels. This implementation catches many instances of double
checked locking, with a low false positive rate. We have experimented with more so-
phisticated detectors for this pattern, but we found that they were not significantly
more effective or accurate.
An example of incorrect double checked locking found in JBoss-4.0.0DR3 is
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// org/jboss/net/axis/server/JBossAuthenticationHandler.java
// Line 178
public void invoke(MessageContext msgContext) throws AxisFault {
// double check does not work on multiple processors, unfortunately
if (!isInitialised) {
synchronized (this) {
if (!isInitialised) {
initialise();
}
}
}
...
Figure 3.13: A double checked locking bug in JBoss-4.0.0DR3
shown in Figure 3.13. This particular example is interesting because not only does
the comment indicate that the programmer was aware the idiom is incorrect, the
initialise() method (not shown) writes a true value to the isInitialised field
before the object has been completely initialized, meaning that the code would
not be correct on a single processor system, even if the Java memory model were
sequentially consistent.
3.10 Inconsistent Synchronization
When mutable state is accessed by multiple threads, it generally needs to be pro-
tected by synchronization. A very common technique in Java is to protect the
mutable fields of an object by acquiring a lock on the object itself. A method may
be defined with the synchronized keyword, in which case a lock on the receiver
object is obtained for the scope of the method. Or, if finer grained synchronization
is desired, a synchronized(this) block may be used to acquire the lock within a
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// java.lang, StringBuffer.java, line 825
public int lastIndexOf(String str)
{
return lastIndexOf(str, count - str.count);
}
Figure 3.14: An atomicity bug in GNU Classpath 0.08
block scope. Classes whose instances are intended to be thread safe should gener-
ally only access shared fields while the instance lock is held. Unsynchronized field
accesses often are race conditions that can lead to incorrect behavior at runtime.
We refer to unsynchronized accesses in classes intended to be thread safe as incon-
sistent synchronization. An example is shown in Figure 3.14. The count field is
read without synchronization and then passed to a synchronized method. Because
the value may be out of date, an ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException exception can
result.
To detect inconsistent synchronization, the FindBugs tool tracks the scope of
locked objects3. For every instance field access, the tool records whether or not a
lock is held on the instance through which the field is accessed. Fields which are
not consistently locked are reported as potential bugs.
We use a variety of heuristics to reduce false positives. Field accesses in ob-
ject lifecycle methods, such as constructors and finalizers, are ignored, because it is
unlikely that the object is visible to multiple threads in those methods. We ignore
3The analysis is intra-procedural, with the addition that calls to non-public methods within a
class are analyzed, and non-public methods called only from locked contexts are considered to be
synchronized as well.
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public fields, on the assumption users must be responsible for guarding synchroniza-
tion of such fields. Volatile fields are also ignored, because under the Java memory
model [40], reads and writes of volatile fields can be used to enforce visibility and or-
dering guarantees between threads. Similarly, final fields are ignored, since they are
largely thread safe (the only exception being cases where objects are made visible
to other threads before construction is complete).
3.10.1 Limitations of the Inconsistent Synchronization Detector
While it is effective at finding many concurrency bugs, the inconsistent synchroniza-
tion detector has some important limitations. First, programs that are free of race
conditions may still have atomicity bugs. A na¨ıve approach to synchronization is to
make every method of a class synchronized. However, successive calls to methods in
such a class will not occur atomically unless a lock on the receiver object is explic-
itly held in a scope surrounding both calls. Another limitation is that the detector
only works when shared fields are synchronized by locking the object instance. Al-
though this is a common technique in Java, it is also common to use explicit lock
objects. Modifying the detector to handle arbitrary lock objects would require more
sophisticated analysis, including some form of heap analysis.
3.11 Wait Not in Loop
Java monitors support notify and wait operations to allow threads to wait for a
condition related to the state of a shared object. For example, in a multithreaded
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blocking queue class, the dequeue() method would wait for the queue to become
nonempty, and the enqueue() method would perform a notify to wake up any
threads waiting for the queue to become nonempty.
Often, a single Java monitor is used for multiple conditions. For such classes,
the correct idiom is to surround the call to wait() with a loop which repeatedly
checks the condition. Without the loop, the thread would not know whether the
condition is actually true when the call to wait() returns.
The condition can fail to be true for several reasons:
• The monitor is being used for multiple conditions, so the condition set by the
notifying thread may not be the one the waiting thread is waiting for.
• In between the notification and the return from wait, another thread obtains
the lock and changes the condition. For example, a thread might be waiting
for a queue to become non-empty. A thread inserts a new element into the
queue and notifies the waiting thread. Before the waiting thread acquires the
lock, another thread removes the element from the queue.
• The specification for the wait() method allows it to spuriously return for no
reason. This can arise due to special handling needed for the interaction of
interrupts and waiting, and because underlying operating system synchroniza-
tion primitives used by the JVM, such as POSIX threads [38], allow spurious
wakeups.
The detector for this bug pattern examines bytecode for a call to wait() which
is not in close proximity to the target of a backwards branch (i.e., a loop head).
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if (!book.isReady()) {
DebugInfo.println("book not ready");
synchronized (book) {
DebugInfo.println("waiting for book");
book.wait();
}
...
}
Figure 3.15: An unconditional wait bug in an early version of the International
Children’s Digital Library
3.12 Unconditional Wait
The Unconditional Wait pattern is a special case of Wait Not In Loop. In this bug
pattern, a wait is performed immediately (and unconditionally) upon entering a
synchronized block. Often, this indicates that the programmer did not include the
test for the waited-for condition as part of the scope of the lock, which could lead
to a missed notification. An example of this bug pattern is shown in Figure 3.15.
If the book object becomes ready after isReady() is called and before the lock is
acquired, the notification could be missed and the thread could block forever.
3.13 Two Lock Wait
Signaling between threads is usually handled by using the wait(), notify(), and
notifyAll() methods. When wait() is invoked, the thread invoking wait must
hold a lock on the object on which wait is invoked, and the lock on that object
is released while the thread is waiting. However, locks on other objects are not
released. This can cause poor performance, and can cause deadlock if they thread
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that is trying to perform a notify needs to acquire that lock.
The detector for this pattern performs an intra-procedural analysis to find the
scope of locks, and emits a warning whenever a method holds multiple locks when
wait is invoked. While occurrences of this pattern are not always bugs, they are
worth inspecting closely to ensure that no deadlocks can arise.
3.14 Dead Local Store
In general, there is no reason to store a value in a local variable unless that value
will be used later. Stores whose values are never loaded are dead stores. They may
be found by performing a backward dataflow analysis to find, at the location of a
store to a local variable, whether its value will be used on any forward path.
A dead store is not necessarily a bug. From our inspection of dead stores
occurring in production code, we have found that most occurrences do not indicate
an actual bug. However, there are two cases which are at least somewhat likely to
be errors:
1. A method parameter immediately overwritten upon method entry
2. An integer increment overwritten by another store
These cases are considered correctness issues. We classify all other dead local stores
as style issues.
Dead local stores are interesting because they strongly suggest that a com-
putation is being performed, but its result is never used. These cases are worth
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inspecting closely because they may reveal a logic error, or may identify code which
has become convoluted through modification and is in need of restructuring.
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Chapter 4
Experiences Analyzing Production Software
Assessing the success of static bug-finding tools is challenging. In general, we can
never know how many real bugs exist in a software artifact. In the absence of formal
requirements and specifications, it is impossible to precisely specify what may be
considered a bug in a particular software artifact. In addition, not every bug is
equally important. Some bugs may prevent the correct functioning of the software,
while other may be mere annoyances. As noted in the Chapter 1, there are very real
costs associated with fixing a bug. For this reason, economic concerns may result in
some defects being left unfixed.
While it would be nice for a static bug checker to guarantee that software is
free from (some kinds of) bugs, the ability to find at least some real bugs is useful.
If a tool allows a developer to find a bug that she otherwise would not have found,
that is a positive outcome. Thus, one measure we can use to judge the effectiveness
of a static bug checker is how many of the bugs it finds are judged by developers to
be worth fixing.
A less direct but perhaps more important measure of success for any software
engineering tool is the extent to which it is adopted by real software developers.
Regular use of a static analysis tool strongly suggests that the tool finds issues
which are judged to be important by developers. Because we have made FindBugs
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available as open-source software, we have had ample opportunity to communicate
with real software developers and to learn of their experiences using the tool.
In this chapter, we investigate the effectiveness of FindBugs at finding bugs
in production software. Section 4.1 describes a study in which we inspected warn-
ings produced by FindBugs on several Java applications and libraries in order to
determine the false positive rate for selected bug detectors. Section 4.2 examines
the inconsistent synchronization detector in more detail, and investigates the gen-
eral question of whether data races in Java programs are accidental or deliberate.
Section 4.3 lists bugs we have reported directly to software maintainers which have
been confirmed as worth fixing. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss adoption of FindBugs
by other organizations.
4.1 Empirical Evaluation of Production Applications and Libraries
It is easy to apply our bug pattern detectors to software. However, evaluating
whether the warnings generated correspond to errors that warrant fixing is a manual,
time-consuming and subjective process. We have applied our best effort to fairly
classify many of the warnings generated by FindBugs for several real applications
and libraries. Each warning is classified in one of the following ways:
• Some bug pattern detectors are very accurate, but determining whether the
situation detected warrants a fix is a judgment call. For example, we can
easily and accurately tell whether a class contains a static field that can be
modified by untrusted code. However, human judgment is needed to determine
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whether that class will ever run in an environment where it can be accessed by
untrusted code. We did not try to judge whether the results of such detectors
warrant fixing, but simply report the warnings generated.
• Some the bug detectors admit false positives, and report warnings in cases
where the situation described by the warning does not, in fact occur. Such
warnings are classified as false positives.
• The warning may reflect a violation of good programming practice but be
unlikely to cause problems in practice. For example, many incorrect synchro-
nization warnings correspond to data races that are real but highly unlikely
to cause problems in practice. Such warnings are classified as mostly harmless
bugs.
• And then there are the cases where the warning is accurate and in our judg-
ment reflects a serious bug that warrants fixing. Such warnings are classified
as serious.
In this section, we report on our manual evaluation of the warnings produced
by FindBugs version 0.9.21 for several warning categories on the following applica-
tions and libraries:
• GNU Classpath, version 0.08
• rt.jar from Sun JDK 1.5.0, build 59
1We used the -effort:max command line option to enable extra analysis, such as pruning
infeasible exception paths, which improve the accuracy of some bug detectors.
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classpath-0.08 rt.jar 1.5.0 build 59
mostly mostly
code warnings serious harmless false pos warnings serious harmless false pos
BC 0 — — — 9 100% 0% 0%
DC 1 100% 0% 0% 88 100% 0% 0%
EC 2 100% 0% 0% 9 100% 0% 0%
IL 2 100% 0% 0% 4 100% 0% 0%
IS2 40 62% 17% 20% 109 45% 45% 8%
NP 14 78% 0% 21% 67 64% 0% 35%
NS 0 — — — 12 25% 66% 8%
OS 6 50% 0% 50% 13 15% 0% 84%
RCN 3 100% 0% 0% 40 60% 2% 37%
RR 9 100% 0% 0% 12 91% 0% 8%
RV 11 45% 0% 54% 8 62% 0% 37%
UR 3 66% 0% 33% 4 100% 0% 0%
UW 2 0% 0% 100% 6 50% 0% 50%
Wa 3 0% 0% 100% 8 37% 0% 62%
Table 4.1: False positive rates for selected bug pattern detectors on GNU Classpath
and Sun J2SE libraries
eclipse-3.0 drjava-stable-20040326
mostly mostly
code warnings serious harmless false pos warnings serious harmless false pos
DC 88 100% 0% 0% 0 — — —
EC 15 73% 0% 26% 0 — — —
IL 3 66% 0% 33% 0 — — —
IS2 61 67% 21% 11% 2 0% 0% 100%
NP 107 65% 4% 29% 0 — — —
NS 14 78% 21% 0% 0 — — —
OS 26 46% 0% 53% 4 100% 0% 0%
RCN 61 49% 29% 21% 0 — — —
RR 39 38% 0% 61% 0 — — —
RV 13 76% 0% 23% 0 — — —
TLW 2 0% 0% 100% 1 0% 0% 100%
UCF 1 100% 0% 0% 0 — — —
UR 4 50% 50% 0% 1 0% 100% 0%
UW 7 28% 0% 71% 3 100% 0% 0%
Wa 12 25% 0% 75% 3 100% 0% 0%
Table 4.2: False positive rates for selected bug pattern detectors on Eclipse and
DrJava
61
jboss-4.0.0RC1 jedit-4.2pre15
mostly mostly
code warnings serious harmless false pos warnings serious harmless false pos
DC 3 100% 0% 0% 0 — — —
EC 4 100% 0% 0% 0 — — —
IS2 25 28% 24% 48% 3 33% 33% 33%
NP 23 82% 4% 13% 3 33% 0% 66%
NS 0 — — — 1 0% 0% 100%
OS 10 60% 0% 40% 4 75% 0% 25%
RCN 10 40% 10% 50% 1 0% 0% 100%
RR 8 62% 25% 12% 5 100% 0% 0%
RV 3 33% 0% 66% 0 — — —
UR 2 50% 0% 50% 1 0% 0% 100%
UW 4 50% 25% 25% 1 100% 0% 0%
Wa 4 0% 0% 100% 2 50% 0% 50%
Table 4.3: False positive rates for selected bug pattern detectors on JBoss and jEdit
• Eclipse, version 3.0
• DrJava, version stable-20040326
• JBoss, version 4.0.0RC1
• jEdit, version 4.2pre15
GNU Classpath [33] is an open source implementation of the core Java runtime
libraries. rt.jar is Sun’s implementation of the APIs for J2SE [39]. Eclipse [19] and
DrJava [18] are popular open source Java integrated development environments.
JBoss [43] is a popular Java application server. jEdit [44] is a programmer’s text
editor. All of the applications and libraries we used in our experiments, with the
possible exception of GNU Classpath, are commercial-grade software products with
large user communities.
None of the analyses implemented in FindBugs is particularly expensive to
perform. On a 1.8 GHz Pentium 4 Xeon system with 1 GB of memory, FindBugs
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Application Eq HE MS Se DE CN
classpath-0.08 2 14 39 14 2 27
rt.jar 1.5.0 build 59 9 55 259 207 89 73
eclipse-3.0 3 170 1,000 49 23 20
drjava-stable-20040326 9 45 37 5 4
jboss-4.0.0RC1 1 18 227 44 10 22
jedit-4.2pre15 6 53 5 1 1
Table 4.4: Warning counts for selected other detectors
took no more than 90 minutes to run all of the bug pattern detectors on any of the
applications we analyzed. To give a sense of the raw speed of the analysis, the version
of rt.jar we analyzed contains 13,083 classes, is about 40 MB in size, and required
approximately one hour to analyze. The maximum amount of memory required to
perform the analyses was approximately 700 MB. We have not attempted to tune
FindBugs for performance or memory consumption.
4.1.1 Empirical Evaluation
Tables 4.1 through 4.3 shows our evaluation of the accuracy of the detectors for
which there are clear criteria for deciding whether or not the reports represent real
bugs. All of the detectors evaluated found at least one bug pattern occurrence which
we classified as a real bug.
It is interesting to note that the accuracy of the detectors varied significantly
by application. For example, the detector for the RR pattern was very accurate for
most applications, but was less successful in finding genuine bugs in Eclipse. The
reason is that most of the warnings in Eclipse were for uses of a custom input stream
class for which the read() methods are guaranteed to return the number of bytes
requested.
63
Our target for bug detectors admitting false positives was that at least 50%
of reported bugs should be genuine. In general, we were fairly close to meeting this
target. Only the UW and Wa detectors were significantly less accurate. However,
given the small number of warnings they produced and the potential difficulty of
debugging timing-related thread bugs, we feel that they performed adequately. We
also found that these detectors were much more successful in finding errors in code
written in undergraduate courses, which illustrates the usefulness of tools in steering
novices towards correct use of difficult language features and APIs.
It is worth emphasizing that all of these applications and libraries (with the
possible exception of GNU Classpath) have been extensively tested, and are used in
production environments. The fact we were able to uncover so many bugs in these
applications makes a very strong argument for the need for automatic bug checking
tools in the development process. Static analysis tools do not require test cases,
and do not have the kind of preconceptions about what code is “supposed” to do
that human observers have. For these reasons, they usefully complement traditional
quality assurance practices.
Ultimately, no technique short of a formal correctness proof will eliminate
every bug. From our evaluation of FindBugs on real applications, we conclude that
simple static tools like bug pattern detectors find an important class of bugs that
would otherwise go undetected.
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Application KLOC FindBugs PMD
classpath-0.08 457 724 4,079
rt.jar 1.5.0 build 59 1,183 3,314 17,133
eclipse-3.0 2,237 4,227 25,227
drjava-stable-20040326 109 293 645
jboss-4.0.0RC1 989 1,188 13,521
jedit-4.2pre15 140 191 1,113
Table 4.5: Application sizes and total number of warnings generated by FindBugs
and PMD
4.1.2 Other Detectors
Table 4.4 lists results for some of our bug detectors for which we did not perform
manual examinations. These detectors are fairly to extremely accurate at detecting
whether software exhibits a particular feature (such as violating the hashcode/equals
contract, or having static fields that could be mutated by untrusted code). However,
it is sometimes a difficult and very subjective judgment as to whether or not the
reported feature is a bug that warrants fixing in each particular instance. We will
simply note that in many cases, these reports represent instances of poor style or
design.
4.1.3 Comparison of FindBugs with PMD
In Table 4.5, we list the number of lines of source code for each benchmark ap-
plication2, the total number of high and medium priority warnings generated by
FindBugs version 0.9.2, and the number of warnings generated by PMD version
1.9 [55]3. In general, FindBugs produces a much lower number of warnings than
2Note that the figure for rt.jar is low because not all of its source code is available in the
standard public distribution.
3For PMD, we used the suggested rule sets: basic, unusedcode, imports, and favorites.
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PMD when used in the default configuration. Undoubtedly, PMD finds a significant
number of bugs in the benchmark applications: however, they are hidden in the
sheer volume of output produced.
We do not claim this comparison shows that FindBugs is “better” than PMD,
or vice versa. Rather, the two tools focus on different aspects of software quality.
Tools like PMD are extremely valuable on enforcing consistent coding style guide-
lines, and making code easier to understand by developers. Tools like FindBugs help
uncover errors, while largely ignoring style issues. Therefore, PMD and FindBugs
complement each other, and neither is a good substitute for the other. (A paper
by Rutar et. al. [58] compares a number of static analysis tools for Java, including
FindBugs and PMD.)
4.1.4 How Many Bugs Remain?
Static analysis will not find every bug. However, we would like to have some idea
of what percentage of all bugs are found by static analysis.
Citing recent results [16] from the Software Engineering Institute, a report by
the Security Across the Software Development Lifecycle Task Force [66] estimates
the number of defects in typical production software at 1–7 per 1,000 lines of code.
For build 59 of the J2SE runtime library, we manually confirmed 256 of the warnings
emitted by FindBugs accurately identify serious defects.
Since we do not have the full source code for the library, we estimated the
number of lines of source code based on inspection of the compiled class files. For
class files with line number information, we can directly measure the number of
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lines in the original source files. We can use this information to compute the ratio of
executable code size (bytecode instructions) to source lines. This ratio can then be
used to estimate the number of lines of code in classes without source line informa-
tion, based on the size of the bytecode. Our estimate for total lines of code in the
library was 5,733,596. Assuming 1–7 defects per 1,000 lines of code, there should be
somewhere between 5,700 to 40,100 total bugs in the library. Based on this estimate,
FindBugs has found somewhere between .6% and 4.4% of all remaining bugs, and
possibly more, since we did not inspect and classify all of the warnings.
There are too many sources of uncertainty for this estimate to be trusted. We
really don’t know how many actual defects remain in this library. However, it seems
likely that FindBugs has made a significant dent in finding the remaining bugs.
In Chapter 5, we present results from a study of student programming projects in
which we can make a more confident estimate of the number of bugs not found by
static analysis.
4.2 Evaluation of Data Races in Production Applications
Data races are a very common form of error in multithreaded programs, and one of
the most difficult to find by testing. A bug caused by a data race may happen so
infrequently that it takes weeks to find. In addition, adding tracing code to help find
the error may alter the timing of the program just enough that the bug no longer
occurs. For these reasons, finding data race bugs before they enter a production
system is extremely important.
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In this section, we evaluate inconsistent synchronization warnings produced
by FindBugs for several multithreaded applications and libraries. In particular, we
examine the assumption that data races are likely to occur because programmers
occasionally forget to use synchronization.
4.2.1 Determining Which Fields Should Be Protected by Locks
Recall that the inconsistent synchronization detector works by inferring which ob-
jects are meant to be thread-safe by looking for occurrences of the common Java
idiom where an object is locked in order to guard accesses to its fields by multiple
threads.
Initially, we assumed that shared fields of objects intended by programmers to
be thread-safe would generally be synchronized consistently, and that bugs would
usually be the result of oversight by the programmer. For example, a programmer
might add a public method to a thread-safe class, but forget to make the method
synchronized. Under this assumption, we used the frequency of unsynchronized
accesses to prioritize the warnings generated for inconsistently synchronized fields.
We hypothesized that fields with 25% or fewer statically unsynchronized accesses
(but at least one unsynchronized access) were probably intended to be synchronized,
so we assigned those cases medium or high priority. We assumed that fields with
25-50% statically unsynchronized accesses were probably only incidentally synchro-
nized, and not intentionally synchronized. Therefore, we assigned those cases low
priority.
To evaluate the appropriateness of our ranking heuristic, we manually cate-
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gorized inconsistent synchronization warnings for several applications and libraries.
We used the same classification scheme as the study described in Section 4.1, clas-
sifying inconsistent synchronization warnings as Serious, Mostly Harmless, or False.
Our decisions were based on manual inspection of the of the code identified
by each warning. While our judgment is fallible, we tried to err on the side of
classifying warnings as false or harmless if we could not see a scenario that would
lead to unintended behavior.
We then studied the number of serious, harmless, and false warnings that
would be reported by the tool for varying cutoff values for the minimum percentage
of unsynchronized field accesses. For example, for a cutoff value of 75%, only fields
whose accesses were synchronized at least 75% of the time would be reported. By
graphing the number of warnings in these categories, we were able to evaluate the
validity of the hypothesis that most of the serious bugs would have a high percentage
of synchronized accesses. We combined the harmless and false categories because
together they represent the set of warnings we believed would not be of interest
to developers. Figure 4.1 shows these graphs for several applications and libraries.
The applications are two implementations of the J2SE core libraries (rt-1.5-b42
and classpath-0.08), a open source Java application server (jboss-4.0.0DR3), and an
open source CORBA ORB (jacorb-2.1). Our hypothesis that fields with lower (but
nonzero) percentages of unsynchronized accesses would be more likely to be errors
was found to be incorrect.
Contrary to our expectations, the graphs show that the likelihood of an in-
consistently synchronized field being a serious bug was not strongly related to the
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Figure 4.1: Serious bugs and false and harmless warnings for varying values for
minimum percentage of synchronized accesses
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percentage of synchronized accesses for the range of cutoff values we examined. In
other words, the inconsistent synchronization bugs we found were not generally the
result of the programmer simply forgetting to synchronize a particular field access
or method. Instead, we found that the lack of synchronization was almost always
intentional—the programmer had deliberately used a race condition to communi-
cate between threads. The data suggests that we should try even lower cutoff values
(below 50%), since many genuine bugs were found for fields synchronized only 50%
of the time. The message to take away here is that lack of synchronization is not
exceptional; for many classes, it is the norm.
4.3 Confirmed Bugs
We have filed official bug reports for some of the bugs found by FindBugs in the
core J2SE runtime library [39]. While direct adoption by developers is perhaps a
better indication of the usefulness of a static analysis tool, filing bug reports is also
a useful validation.
The reports we have filed which have been acknowledged to be bugs by Sun
include:
• Bug 6179014, an infinite recursive loop (shown in Figure 3.7)
• Bugs 6179614, 6179620, 6252367, 6265746, 6266406, 6282820, 6288271, and
6288277, also infinite recursive loops
• Bug 6289605, a null pointer exception
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• Bug 5027753, a redundant comparison to null
• Bug 6266406, which reports a number of defects in the classes implementing
JNDI, the Java Native Debugging Interface
• Bug 5023830, a class which defines equals(), but not hashCode()
• Bug 5027748, use of unnecessary String constructors in the java.util.regex
classes
• Bug 6202042, creation of an object which was never used
• Bug 6228736, a data race in ByteArrayOutputStream
We have also filed several bug reports against GNU Classpath [33]. Bugs
13457 (ignored method return values) and 13455 (load and dereference of a value
from an unwritten field) were acknowledged to be genuine, but had already been
fixed in the development source code repository. Bug 13456, an ignored return value
from String.trim(), was acknowledged and fixed. Bug 13458, a redundant null
comparison, has been assigned to a developer, but not fixed. 12 other reports are
still pending, although we have very high confidence that these are serious problems
and will eventually be addressed.
4.4 Adoption
Since we made FindBugs publicly available under an open source license, it has been
used by many of individuals and organizations.
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Figure 4.2: FindBugs downloads
4.4.1 Downloads and Web Hits
FindBugs development is hosted at SourceForge [62], which provides free web host-
ing for open-source projects. One of the services SourceForge provides is activity
statistics, including numbers of file downloads and web page hits over time. This
information is a useful gauge of the level of interest generated by a project, and may
serve as a rough indication of the number of active users.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the number of downloads and web page hits for the
FindBugs project from December 2003 (when the project first moved to Source-
Forge) to the present. There were 14 official FindBugs releases during this period.
Interest in FindBugs has been relatively strong; as of June 2005, FindBugs down-
loads average about 400 per day. While not every developer who downloads Find-
73
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
Nov 03 Jan 04 Mar 04 May 04 Jul 04 Sep 04 Nov 04 Jan 05 Mar 05 May 05 Jul 05
W
eb
 P
ag
e 
Hi
ts
 (th
ou
sa
nd
s)
Month
FindBugs Web Traffic
Figure 4.3: FindBugs web page hits
Bugs will become a regular user, we believe that its continuing popularity is evidence
that many developers find it to be a valuable tool.
4.4.2 Adoption by Open Source Projects
Open source projects serve a very useful role in the evaluation of software engineering
tools, because the development process is conducted in the open. In particular, code
repositories, bug databases, and other sources of information about the software
engineering practices used by these projects is available at the click of the mouse.
To see if FindBugs has been adopted by any open source projects, we simply
entered the term “findbugs” into the Google web search engine [34]. Many of hits
are HTML reports produced by FindBugs. By checking the website hosting the
report, we found several examples of open source projects which appear to have
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used FindBugs as part of the development process. Some examples include:
• The Jakarta Commons project, a collection of reusable Java components
(http://jakarta.apache.org/commons)
• Middlegen, a tool to generate object persistence and GUI code from a database
schema (http://boss.bekk.no/boss/middlegen)
• ArgoUML, a UML-based object-oriented modeling application
(http://argouml.tigris.org)
• JaxoDraw, a tool for drawing Feynman diagrams
(http://eee.uv.es/∼JaxoDraw/)
• SAT4J, a SAT solver library for Java (http://www.sat4j.org)
• bddbddb, an implementation of Datalog using Binary Decision Diagrams to
represent relations (http://bddbddb.sourceforge.net)
It is somewhat difficult to know whether these reports indicate that FindBugs
was used only once, or whether it is used regularly. From closer inspection of the
project website, it is clear that the ArgoUML project runs FindBugs regularly as
part of their build process. The projects running FindBugs using the Maven [52]
project management system, which include Middlegen, bddbddb, and JaxoDraw,
are likely to be running FindBugs regularly, because FindBugs is not a standard
part of Maven, indicating that the developers must have thought it was worth the
effort to install and configure separately. The extent to which the developers of
75
these projects find the output of FindBugs useful is hard to determine, although
from casual inspection of the reports available online, it appears that FindBugs is
finding some interesting issues. For example, the report for ArgoUML lists 1 null
pointer dereference and 164 redundant null comparisons.
We have also discovered projects using FindBugs though more indirect means.
For example, the source distribution for the Berkeley DB Java Edition (http://www.
sleepycat.com/products/je.shtml) contains a file called FindBugsExclude.xml,
which is a filter for excluding false warnings from being reported by FindBugs.
4.5 User Experiences
While raw data on downloads and web page hits provides some evidence of a tool’s
usefulness, it does not offer any insight on how the tool is used in a real development
environment. Because FindBugs has an active user community, we have had many
opportunities to communicate with software developers to learn more about how
FindBugs fits into their development process, and what kinds of bugs it finds.
This section summarizes feedback about FindBugs we have received from users.
These reports are not meant to be rigorous; in particular, we cannot say that the
developers who responded are a representative sample of Java developers or Find-
Bugs users. However, their responses do provide a glimpse of how a static analysis
tool can be useful in a real software development process.
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4.5.1 An Informal Survey
In June 2005, we sent an email message to the main FindBugs discussion mailing
list asking for feedback from users about how they were applying FindBugs in their
development projects. In particular, we asked users to comment on the following
issues:
1. What kind of software FindBugs was applied to
2. How often FindBugs was run
3. At what stage of development FindBugs was most useful
4. What kinds of bugs FindBugs has found, and whether they were interesting
or important
5. What techniques were used to handle false positives
10 users responded to the survey. Most users who responded were developing server
or middleware applications. This is not too surprising, considering the popularity
of Java in this domain.
We were somewhat surprised to find that most respondents run FindBugs
frequently, as part of active development (4/10), or as part of a nightly or weekly
build (3/10). The other respondents use FindBugs only when incorporating major
changes, or as part of pre-release testing. The fact that these developers are using
the tool relatively frequently suggests that the information the tool produces is
deemed worthwhile, and that false warnings are not a serious problem.
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All of the developers who responded found FindBugs to be most useful during
active development, because it allowed them to find some bugs early in the devel-
opment process. Several developers also found the tool useful for reviewing existing
codebases. These responses confirm our general view of the role of static analysis
tools as a first line of defense against programming errors.
We received a variety of responses regarding the kinds of bugs found by Find-
Bugs, and their importance. All of the respondents confirmed that FindBugs had
found real bugs in their software. Most (8/10) had found at least some serious bugs
in their code. One user who works as both a software developer and a consultant
noted that FindBugs had found very little of interest on his own code, but had
found numerous problems in his clients’ code. Among the most interesting kinds of
problems identified by FindBugs were null pointer dereferences, suspicious reference
comparisons, and thread synchronization errors.
Interestingly, 5 of the 10 respondents reported that they were not using any
false warning suppression strategy, and were willing to review all FindBugs warnings
on a regular basis. This suggests the current false warning suppression heuristics im-
plemented in FindBugs are reasonably effective, and that for most code FindBugs
does not report an unmanageable number of warnings. The other 5 respondents
used filtering (by detector, class, or method) to suppress false warnings. We were
somewhat surprised to find that two developers were willing to modify code to sup-
press false warnings. This suggests that some false warnings, while not actually
identifying an exploitable bug, may still highlight sufficiently dubious code to merit
a cleanup. This points out an interesting advantage of using simple analysis tech-
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niques: code which confuses the static analysis is also likely to confuse developers
trying to understand it. One developer wrote:
Interestingly, really nasty bugs are found by detectors that don’t exactly
look for the problem that are found because the detector found something
tangentially, and by digging around a little, a big problem surfaces. Even
reported bugs that we “don’t care about” tend to point up other, more
serious problems.
This phenomenon also lends support to the idea that static analysis tools can help
draw attention to particularly buggy parts of the code, since defects tend to cluster
[47].
In addition to responding to the specific questions we solicited, several respon-
dents also provided more general feedback. A common theme in these comments
was that FindBugs was a good way to learn about some of the more obscure areas
of Java. For example:
One of the really neat things is your bug descriptions, which serve as a
learning tool. I’ve been doing Java for years and some of the things you
detect are totally new to me.
Also:
FindBugs is also a fantastic way to learn more about Java. People are
learning all the time while using FindBugs, often discussing what it is
reporting about and what it means to us. Over time, these issues become
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ingrained into the developer and there are less repetitive reports as time
goes by.
4.5.2 A Geographic Information System Application
One FindBugs user is a team leader in an organization developing a Geographic
Information System application. The application comprises over 200 packages, 2,000
classes, and 400,000 lines of code.
The first time FindBugs was applied to this code base, it reported around 3,000
warnings. The developers on the project spent about 1 week addressing these issues,
eventually getting the total number of warnings down below 1,000. This shows that,
for this application, a significant number of the warnings issued by FindBugs were
judged by the developers to be worth fixing. The project leader notes that they
are still fixing some of the remaining warnings. Some of the specific types of errors
reported by FindBugs that the developers have fixed are hashcode/equals problems,
serialization issues, unchecked method return values, unused fields and constants,
mutable static data, and null pointer dereferences.
Two specific errors caught by FindBugs illustrate how static analysis tools
can be useful for finding subtle bugs in code that appears to be correct upon first
inspection. For example, the developers found the following problem stemming from
an incorrect boolean operator:
if ((tagged == null) && (tagged.length < rev))
The second error resulted from confusion between an instance field and an identically
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named method parameter:
public void setData(String keyName, String valName,
HashMap hashMap)
{
if (hashMap != null)
this.hashMap = hashMap;
else
this.hashMap = new HashMap(true);
if (hashMap.size() > 0) {
...
}
Both of these examples look like they ought to work, making it hard to find them
by human inspection.
Finally, the lead developer notes that FindBugs has been helpful in large part
because of its ease of application; it can be run on the entire application in a few
minutes.
4.5.3 A Financial Application
Another user has applied FindBugs to a large (350K lines of code) financial appli-
cation. He notes that upon first running FindBugs on the application, it produced
300 warnings. Of those, the development team considered about 50 to be real bugs.
Many of the remaining warnings are false positives, some of which the team sup-
presses using a pattern-matching filter.
Figure 4.4 shows a graph of the number of warnings produced by FindBugs,
CheckStyle [10], and PMD [55] on the application, over a period of about 5 months.
This graph illustrates the distinction between bug and style checkers. Both PMD
and CheckStyle, which focus mainly on style issues, produce a far larger number of
81
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
N
um
be
r o
f w
ar
ni
ng
s
Build number
FindBugs
CheckStyle
PMD
Figure 4.4: Number of warnings produced by FindBugs, CheckStyle, and PMD on
a large financial application
warnings than FindBugs. This illustrates the importance of the distinction between
bug and style checkers. The fact that the style checkers produced a relatively high
number of warnings that were not fixed demonstrates that their role is not to find
specific bugs, but to check conformance to existing project standards practices.
Tools such as FindBugs can make a valuable addition to style checkers, since they
find a significant number of real bugs while producing only a moderate number of
overall warnings.
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Chapter 5
Experiences Analyzing Student Programming Projects
In this chapter, we discuss using FindBugs to analyze programs written by students
in an introductory programming course. Student projects are an interesting target
for static analysis for two reasons.
First, by analyzing student projects we can find out what kinds of coding er-
rors students are likely to make. We know from experience that many students find
introductory programming courses to be a difficult experience. Without experience
to guide them, students struggling to get past a particular stumbling block can
become caught up in unproductive “Brownian motion” programming, where they
make a series of random changes in the hope of making the project work. This kind
of experience can be very discouraging, and may have a negative effect on student
retention, especially for students without significant prior programming experience.
We surmised that at least some errors typically made by students might be de-
tectable using static analysis, and that by targeting FindBugs to find some of these
errors, we might be able to improve students’ experience in the course.
Second, student projects are a very useful source of data for evaluating and
improving the accuracy of static analysis. Code written by professional programmers
often is complex, vaguely specified, and generally lacks an objective way to measure
whether or not the code is implemented correctly. In contrast, student projects
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in introductory programming courses tend to be simple, well-specified, and most
importantly, often have a test suite to measure how well the implementation matches
the specification. A comprehensive test suite allows us to do something that is
extremely difficult to do for arbitrary production software artifacts: determine what
bugs are not found by static analysis.
By analyzing static analysis warnings and test failures for student projects,
we can make progress toward two important objectives:
1. Finding new bug patterns, by examining test failures not predicted by any
static analysis warning
2. Improving analysis effectiveness and accuracy by identifying and addressing
the causes of false negatives and false positives
5.1 The Marmoset Project
In order to better understand bugs in student code, we developed a project snapshot,
submission, and testing system called Marmoset [63, 64]. Like many similar systems,
Marmoset allows students to submit versions of their projects to a central server,
which automatically tests them against a suite of unit tests and stores the results
in a database. However, it differs from previous systems in two ways.
First, it employs a novel mechanism for providing feedback about the results of
unit tests. Students can request to see the names of passed unit tests, along with the
names of the first two failed unit tests, subject to the availability of release tokens.
Each student has a small number of tokens available. Once used, a token regenerates
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after a fixed period of time. For the courses in which we have used Marmoset, we
have given students 3 release tokens, each of which regenerates 24 hours after being
used. This system encourages students to start work early (since the release tokens
can only be used a fixed number of times per day), and also provides an incentive
for students to think carefully about their work before using a token.
The second novel feature of Marmoset is that it collects fine-grained snapshots
of student projects as they work. Each time a student saves a file, her work is
automatically committed to a CVS [14] repository. Over time this creates a detailed
history of each student’s work. Most of the code changes captured by Marmoset are
small: 70% add or change no more than 4 lines of code. A summary of the number
of code snapshots and the sizes of code deltas from one snapshot to the next from
one semester of an introductory Java programming course is shown in Figure 5.1.
In this course, Marmoset captured 33,015 unique snapshots from 73 students over
the course of 8 programming projects. These snapshots are an ideal laboratory for
studying bugs: they record the work of many programmers using many different
programming styles and idioms, and record the code changes made during active
development, allowing us to see how bugs are introduced and fixed.
5.2 Discovering New Bug Patterns
One important use of the student snapshot data has been to discover new bug
patterns. A simple and effective way to discover new bug patterns is to look at unit
tests which fail because of a runtime exception. When we examine all snapshots in
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Lines Added Number of
or Changed Commits Total
1 12,873 39%
2 5,484 56%
3-4 4,726 70%
5-8 3,608 81%
9-16 2,503 88%
17-32 1,229 92%
33-64 612 94%
65+ 352 100%
Figure 5.1: Summary of delta sizes for code snapshots captured in CMSC 132
(Object-Oriented Programming II) in Fall 2004
which a particular type of runtime exception is thrown, odds are good that we will
find that many of those exceptions occurred for similar reasons: a candidate for a
bug pattern.
Table 5.1 shows the number of student code snapshots where at least one unit
test failed with a runtime exception for the Fall 2004 and Spring 2005 semesters
of CMSC 132. Null pointer exceptions were the most frequent problem. We
found that a surprising number of tests failed because of StackOverflowError and
ClassCastException. By examining snapshots where these exceptions occurred,
we were able to generalize common causes. This process led to the development of
detectors for Infinite Recursive Loops (Section 3.5) and Bad Casts (Section 3.6).
Although both the IL and BC patterns are common in code written by be-
ginning programmers, we have also found many occurrences of these patterns in
production code. This confirms our observation that simple, dumb mistakes can be
found in almost all software.
The exception data indicates that many bugs in student code are due to an
86
Number of
Exception type snapshots
NullPointerException 10,684
ClassCastException 4,348
IndexOutOfBoundsException 3,094
OutOfMemoryError 2,605
StringIndexOutOfBoundsException 2,124
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException 2,084
StackOverflowError 1,949
NoSuchElementException 1,928
IllegalArgumentException 1,877
IOException 1,683
Table 5.1: Most frequently occurring runtime exceptions in student code snapshots
out-of-bounds index used to read an element from an array, string, or list. While
these bugs are certainly worth investigating, they may be unlikely to have common
causes which could be generalized as a bug pattern.
5.3 Experimental Setup
In order to measure the effectiveness of FindBugs on student code, we examined
student code snapshots from two programming projects:
• Web Spider: crawl web pages in depth-first or breadth-first order
• Search Tree: implement a balanced binary tree
We annotated both projects with @NonNull and @PossiblyNull annotations for
parameters and return values. (The meaning of these annotations is described
in Section 3.3.10.) For example, the Spider.crawl() method of the Web Spi-
der project takes a URL object as a parameter. We annotated the parameter as
@NonNull, since crawl() is required to use the URL object. Another example is
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the Spider.getNextPageToCrawl() method, which returns null if there are no
more pages to crawl. Therefore, the return value of this method was annotated
as @PossiblyNull. Adding annotations allowed us to measure their effectiveness at
finding null pointer bugs (beyond those found by our basic intra-procedural analy-
sis.)
In addition to null pointer bugs, we also looked at stack overflow and dynamic
type cast bugs, both of which manifest as easily recognizable runtime exceptions,
have detectors implemented in FindBugs, and pinpoint a precise source line where
a runtime exception is expected if the warning is accurate.
For both projects, we measured the rate of false negatives and false positives.
False negatives are snapshots where a runtime exception occurs without any warn-
ing predicting the exception. False positives are warnings that do not predict any
runtime exception.
The main question in measuring false negatives and false positives is which
snapshots and warnings to count. There are two issues to consider in answering this
question. First, we cannot easily evaluate the accuracy of a warning if the statement
it identifies is never executed. To resolve this issue, we collected code coverage data
for each unit test, and excluded all warnings never covered by any test case from
consideration. The second issue is slightly more subtle. Because Marmoset collects
fine-grained snapshots, it tends to record a single warning or runtime exception
many times. If we consider all snapshots and warnings, we tend to overcount those
that persist through many successive versions. This will overcount warnings that
are false positives, and may undercount exceptions that are false negatives. To solve
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this problem, we only counted warnings that are either removed in the subsequent
snapshot, or are present in the final snapshot, as potential false positives. Likewise,
for potential false negatives we only counted the first in a chronological series of
snapshots where a particular runtime exception occurred.
After selecting the subset of snapshots and warnings to count, we calculated
false negatives and false positives as follows:
False negatives =
Snapshots with exception but no warning
Snapshots with exception
False positives =
Warnings with no exception thrown
Warnings
5.4 Discussion of Results
The results of the experiment are shown in Figures 5.2 through 5.5.
Warnings issued by the strictly intra-procedural null pointer analysis (Fig-
ure 5.2) were very accurate, with a 2% false positive rate, but predicted only a
small percentage of the null pointer exceptions, with a 70% false negative rate for
the Web Spider project and a 98% false negative rate for the Search Tree project.
Fortunately, with the addition of annotations (Figure 5.3), the situation improves
greatly. The analysis finds more than 50% of the null pointer bugs in the Search Tree
project, and nearly 80% of the null pointer bugs in the Web Spider project. The
higher percentage of bugs found comes at the cost of increasing the false positive
rate. However, the observed rate of 10%–21% is still very acceptable.
The detectors for infinite recursive loops and bad dynamic casts (Figures 5.4
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With Observed
Project Snapshots warning false neg. %
Search Tree 71 1 98
Web Spider 162 47 70
With Observed
Project Warnings exception false pos. %
Search Tree 2 2 0
Web Spider 77 75 2
Table 5.2: Observed false negative and false positive rates for null pointer warnings
in student projects (without annotations)
and 5.5) were generally not as effective as the null pointer bug detector. The infinite
loop detector did find almost 90% of the stack overflow exceptions in the Web Spider
project. However, this was due mainly to the fact that most of those bugs were
caused by many students misinterpreting an API comment in the same way (as
shown in Figure 3.11). The resulting bugs were easily detectable. The detector
was not as effective at finding stack overflows in the Search Tree project. For both
projects, the warnings that were issued were very accurate. The bad cast detector
found 8% and 32% of the class cast exceptions for the Search Tree and Web Spider
projects, respectively, with a reasonably low rate of false positives.
5.5 Reasons for False Negatives and False Positives
As we classified false negatives and false positives, we tried to identify ways in which
the static analysis could be made more accurate. In keeping with our philosophy
of using the simplest analysis techniques possible, we only enumerated cases where
a simple technique or heuristic could be effective, and labeled the other cases as
90
With Observed
Project Snapshots warning false neg. %
Search Tree 71 38 46
Web Spider 162 127 21
With Observed
Project Warnings exception false pos. %
Search Tree 40 36 10
Web Spider 129 101 21
Table 5.3: Observed false negative and false positive rates for null pointer warnings
in student projects (with annotations)
With Observed
Project Snapshots warning false neg. %
Search Tree 46 7 84
Web Spider 18 16 11
With Observed
Project Warnings exception false pos. %
Search Tree 7 7 0
Web Spider 16 16 0
Table 5.4: Observed false negative and false positive rates for infinite recursive loop
warnings in student projects
With Observed
Project Snapshots warning false neg. %
Search Tree 28 2 92
Web Spider 50 16 68
With Observed
Project Warnings exception false pos. %
Search Tree 2 2 0
Web Spider 17 11 35
Table 5.5: Observed false negative and false positive rates for dynamic cast warnings
in student projects
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False neg. False pos.
Reason occurrences occurrences
Complex program state or calling context 45 25
Value loaded from Map 10 2
Incomplete object initialization 11 0
Infeasible branch 0 3
Invalid null check using compareTo() 1 0
Implementation more robust than annotation 0 2
Table 5.6: Reasons for null pointer false negatives and false positives
False neg.
Reason occurrences
Complex program state or calling context 23
No modified data read on path to recursive call site 4
No heap writes on path to recursive call site 14
Table 5.7: Reasons for infinite recursive loop false negatives
“complex.”
Figures 5.6 through 5.8 list the causes of false negatives and false positives
for the snapshots we inspected. While these classifications are informal, they do
point out some relatively easy ways to improve the accuracy of the underlying anal-
yses. The remainder of this section briefly describes each source of inaccuracy we
identified.
Complex program state or calling context. This is a catch-all category
for false negatives or false positives which would require detailed information about
the program state or calling context to correct. In other words, these are cases
where we do not envision a simple analysis or heuristic being effective at avoiding
the inaccuracy.
Value loaded from Map. These are false negatives or false positives result-
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False neg. False pos.
Reason occurrences occurrences
Complex program state or calling context 3 0
Stronger type analysis needed (field types) 21 0
Non-Comparable object added to SortedSet 4 0
Stronger type analysis needed (method return types) 9 6
Implicit type parameter of collection is violated 21 0
Using wrong map iterator 2 0
Table 5.8: Reasons for dynamic cast false negatives and false positives
ing from a call to the get() method on a Map object. False negative arise because
the program dereferences the return value in cases where the Map does not contain
the requested entry. False positives arise due to annotations: a call to a method
whose return value is declared @PossiblyNull is dereferenced immediately because
the caller knows the method is implemented by a map lookup of a key known to be
in the map. It is possible we might be able to construct a static analysis to deter-
mine when a calling context will use a key guaranteed to definitely be in the map,
or guaranteed not to be in the map, and issue or suppress a warning as appropriate.
Infeasible Branch. Infeasible control flow is a common source of inaccuracy
in program analysis. One kind of false positive we noticed several times in the
search tree project was code of the following form appearing in a method whose
return value was declared @NonNull:
int value = ...
Object result = null;
if (value < 0) {
result = non-null value
} else if (value > 0) {
result = non-null value
} else if (value == 0) {
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result = non-null value
}
return result;
The final if statement is guaranteed to evaluate to a true value due to the range
of the variable value. Because the else branch in infeasible, result is guaranteed
to be non-null when the return statement is reached. We could eliminate this
particular form of false positive using a value range analysis.
Incomplete object initialization. We noticed several instances of null
pointer exceptions caused by loading a value from a field not initialized by the
object’s constructor. In these cases, the uninitialized field is assigned a non-null
value by at least one public method. However, if the field is loaded and derefer-
enced before any method which initializes the field is called, then a null pointer
exception will occur. These cases could be found by looking for classes with public
constructors that fail to completely initialize all of the object’s fields, and public
methods which dereference possibly-uninitialized fields without a check. Careful
evaluation would be needed to ensure that a detector taking this approach did not
produce too many false positives.
Invalid null check using compareTo(). In one case, a student tried to
check whether or not an object reference was null by calling the compareTo()method
on it, passing a null value as the argument. The Comparable interface that defines
this method does not require it to handle a null argument, so a null pointer exception
is very likely in this case. In general, a large number of classes and interfaces in the
standard Java library could have their parameters or return values annotated with
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@NonNull and @PossiblyNull to catch bugs like this one.
Implementation more robust than annotation. Some students imple-
mented methods which were more robust than required by the project specifica-
tions. For example, although the SearchTreeMap.put() method in the Search Tree
project was specified as having a @NonNull key, some students coded this method
to allow (and ignore) null keys, and tested this functionality in their own test cases.
Relaxing the annotation of the method would eliminate these false positives.
No heap writes on path to recursive call site. If no heap writes occur
on the path from the entry point of a method to a recursive call which passes all
method parameters as arguments, it is safe to assume that an infinite recursive loop
will be entered. Our detector for infinite recursive loops can detect this situation
as long as all heap reads and writes are local to the method; however, if a method
call is seen, it makes the conservative assumption that any heap location could be
read or written, and thus the recursive invocation might take a different path. In
the Search Tree project, we noticed several cases of false negatives due to method
calls between the method entry and recursive call site where the called methods
were “read-only.” For example, calling the compareTo() method to compare two
objects typically does not modify heap state. Therefore, we could eliminate some
of these false negatives by encoding knowledge of methods which are read-only by
convention.
No modified data read on path to recursive call site. Another source of
false negatives we noticed in the Search Tree project were methods which performed
logically write-only operations on an object passed to the method, but did not invoke
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any methods which would reveal changes to that object on the path to a recursive
call where all of the method parameters were passed as arguments. This suggests
that we might be able to catch some of these cases by expanding the detector’s
definition of reads and writes to encompass knowledge about “logical” read and
write operations on objects, such as instances of container classes.
Implicit type parameter of collection is violated. Prior to the introduc-
tion of generic types into Java [41], generic containers were written using Object
references as the element type for collections. In theory, it is possible to store unre-
lated object types in a container, since all objects are subtypes of the base Object
class. However, in practice all containers have implicit type parameters specifying
what kinds of types are allowed in the container. Because these parameters are
implicit, they are prone to being violated if the programmer is confused about what
kind of objects a container actually stores, and either tries to cast an object ob-
tained from the container to the wrong type, or puts the wrong type of object in the
container. This was the largest source of missed dynamic cast bugs. Every one of
the false negatives in this category would have been found at compile time if generic
types were used.
Non-Comparable object added to SortedSet. We noticed several in-
stances of an object not implementing the Comparable interface being added to a
SortedSet. Unless the set uses an explicit comparator object, this will result in
a ClassCastException when the implicit comparator tries to cast the elements to
Comparable. (An analogous situation can arise for keys used with SortedMap ob-
jects.) To catch such cases, our analysis would need to identify SortedSet objects
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not having an explicit comparator, and check elements passed to their add()method
to ensure they implement Comparable.
Using wrong map iterator. Some students attempted to iterate through
either the keys or values of a Map object using an entrySet()’s iterator, which
returns Map.Entry objects. We could extend our analysis to check the uses of
iterator objects returned from entrySet().iterator() to ensure that they are
cast to Map.Entry, and not some other type. Note that these cases would be caught
at compile time using Java generics.
Stronger type inference needed (method return types). Our detector
for suspicious dynamic casts issues a warning when a generic collection interface,
such as List or Map, is cast to an abstract or concrete collection class type, such
as AbstractSet or HashMap. Such casts are unnecessary, violate encapsulation,
and generally indicate confusion or malice on the programmer’s part. However, if
the reference really is of the correct type, these casts are harmless. Some of the
false positives generated by FindBugs could be eliminated using more powerful type
inference. For example, a method declared to return List might be guaranteed
to return LinkedList, allowing the more precise type to be known at call sites.
However, suppressing these false positives is almost certainly a bad idea, because a
method return type defines a contract between the caller and the callee. If a method
is declared to return List, then it is perfectly valid to return any subtype of List.
Implementations that violate this encapsulation are very likely to break when the
program is modified and the method is changed to return a different subtype.
Stronger type inference needed (field types). We noticed several dy-
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namic cast bugs not caught by FindBugs where a value was loaded from a field
and immediately cast to a subtype of the field’s declared type. The analysis could
potentially keep track of the concrete types stored in fields, and issue a warning if a
cast was used when it was likely that any of several subtypes could be stored in the
field. However, it is likely that some or most such warnings would be false positives,
because the code could have knowledge of what type was stored in the field based
on the program state. Since fields are usually private to the implementation of a
class, breaking encapsulation is not a concern; so a false positive referring to a value
loaded from a field involved in a dynamic cast would be less acceptable than a false
positive referring to a value returned from a method.
98
Chapter 6
Experiences Studying Static Analysis Warnings Over Time
As code is modified and software evolves, static analysis results will also change.
We would like to be able to understand changes in static analysis results in order to
determine several important phenomena. By looking at when warnings come into
existence and when they disappear, we can gain insight on which warnings represent
bugs, and therefore where bugs are being fixed in the software. We can also look
for warnings which persist through many versions of the software, which are likely
to be false positives.
Being able to compare warnings through multiple versions is also important
for false positive suppression. As developers inspect warnings and classify them as
serious or false positives, we can carry these classifications forward to new versions
of the software. In this way, developers can avoid inspecting the same false positives
over and over again.
6.1 Comparing Warnings Across Versions
Software artifacts are not static. Most software is developed in an environment
of constantly changing requirements and specifications. As features are added and
changed, and as bugs are fixed, the code changes continuously. Static analysis tools
must accommodate this change by being able to determine when static analysis
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warnings are “the same” in two different versions of the software artifact. We refer
to this problem as the warning comparison problem.
The obvious difficulty in comparing warnings from different versions of the
same software artifact is that because the underlying code may be different, the
details of the warnings, such as class names, method names, and source line numbers,
may be different, even though the underlying cause of the warnings is the same. For
this reason, a warning comparison procedure must have some degree of fuzziness,
allowing warnings from different versions of the code to match even though some
underlying details may have changed. However, if the comparison procedure is too
fuzzy, it risks being unable to distinguish warnings which are actually different.
6.1.1 Warning Comparators
A warning comparison procedure, or warning comparator, allows us to perform set
operations on collections of warnings from different software versions. A warning
comparator may be viewed as a function that takes two warnings from different
software versions and returns true if they are equivalent, or false if they are not
equivalent. The notion of “equivalence” is inherently vague. In general, it is meant
to capture the notion that the warnings describe the same code features in both
versions, and were issued for the same reason. However, because some of the relevant
code may have changed between the two versions, the features of the warnings may
be slightly different.
FindBugs supports two warning comparators. Both comparators work by com-
paring warnings based on their attributes. (Warning attributes and the data model
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for warnings are described in Section B.1.)
The exact warning comparator compares warnings based on the bug pattern
type, and all class, method, field, and source line attributes, all of which must match
exactly in order for the compared warnings to be considered equivalent. Source lines
within methods are compared as offsets from the beginning of the method, rather
than as absolute line numbers within the source file. The idea is to allow code to be
added or removed earlier in the file without affecting the ability to match warnings
inside the method, as long as the method has not changed. When the exact warning
comparator judges two warnings to be equivalent, it is very likely that the warnings
really are the same. However, small changes in line numbers within a method may
cause the warning to fail to match some warnings which are equivalent.
The fuzzy warning comparator matches bug pattern type and class, method,
and field attributes only. It ignores source line attributes. For this reason, it may
consider some warnings equivalent when they are not. However, this is only possible
for warnings in the same method. Given the relatively small number of warnings
emitted per method, the overall accuracy of the fuzzy comparator is reasonably
good—we have measured it as more than 90% accurate when comparing warnings
between versions of the core J2SE libraries. Unlike the exact comparator, it tolerates
changes in source line numbers within methods.
6.1.2 Set Operations
The important operations on sets of warningsWn andWn+1 representing the results
of applying static analysis to software versions n and n+ 1 are:
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1. Added warnings: Wn+1 −Wn
2. Removed warnings: Wn −Wn+1
3. Retained warnings: Wn ∩Wn+1
All of these operations can be reduced to the problem of matching equivalent
warnings in Wn and Wn+1. After all equivalent warnings are matched, the un-
matched warnings in Wn are in the removed set, and unmatched warnings in Wn+1
are in the added set.
FindBugs matches warnings incrementally by starting with the exact com-
parator, and moving to increasingly fuzzy comparators. Each comparator is used
to greedily match as many equivalent warnings as possible. If a warning in Wn
matches multiple warnings in Wn+1, one of them is picked arbitrarily. The process
terminates when all warnings in either Wn or Wn+1 are matched with an equivalent
warning, or when there are no more comparators. This approach has the advantage
that the exact comparator will be used to match warnings in methods that have
not been modified, while less accurate comparators will only be used for warnings
in code that has been changed.
6.1.3 Handling Moved or Renamed Classes
As code evolves, classes may be renamed, or moved from one package to another.
This makes comparing classes from different software versions somewhat compli-
cated. For the warnings comparators used in FindBugs we have implemented a
simple technique which can detect when classes are moved to a different pack-
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age. Before comparing warnings from different software versions, the tool notes
“removed” classes, which classes exist only in the first version, and ”added” classes,
which classes exist only in the second version. It then looks among the added and
removed classes for pairs of classes which differ only by package name. These classes
are then considered to be the same when matching warnings.
We have not yet implemented a technique to detect renamed classes. That
problem is somewhat harder; without class names to guide the tool, it is difficult
to know which pairs of classes it should consider equivalent. We have experimented
with a similarity metric based on class features which would be likely to be un-
changed after a renaming, such as field names and types, with some initial success.
6.2 A Case Study
One of our primary motivations for developing warning matching techniques was as
a tool to investigate whether or not the warnings produced by FindBugs identify
bugs that are actually fixed by the developers of the software. A common criticism
of work on static analysis to find bugs is that the bugs found are often trivial,
and that fixing them will not necessarily result in a noticeable improvement in
software quality. This criticism is very difficult to address, since for most software
artifacts we do not know how many bugs exist overall, or where the “important”
bugs are. In our study of student programming projects (Chapter 5) we were able
to partially address this concern by measuring the false negative rate for certain
kinds of bugs, based on matching warnings and unit test failures. However, most
103
production software artifacts do not have a sufficiently comprehensive test suite for
this kind of experiment. Nonetheless, we can show some evidence that our static
analysis tool finds important bugs by showing that developers are willing to fix at
least some of the bugs it reports.
As a case study, we looked at several versions of the Berkeley DB, Java Edition
[8]. This project is an interesting example for several reasons. First, based on the
existence of a false positive suppression filter, we discovered that FindBugs had been
used as part of the development process. The software is widely used, and because
it is an embedded database supporting concurrency and transactions, freedom from
defects is an important requirement. Our goal was to use our warning matching
techniques to find evidence that bugs reported by FindBugs were being fixed.
We looked at four versions of the software:
1. Version 1.3.0: a beta release
2. Version 1.5.0: first production release (61 KLOC)
3. Version 1.7.1: FindBugs used for this and later versions
4. Version 2.0.24: current release (77 KLOC)
For each version of the software, we ran FindBugs and used our warning match-
ing algorithm to find removed, retained, and added warnings. Table 6.1 shows the
results of this analysis.
Our hypothesis was that we would see a significant number of warnings re-
moved at the point in the development history where FindBugs was used for the
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Warnings
Version Added Removed Retained Active
1.3.0 0 0 0 88
1.5.0 3 8 79 87
1.7.1 6 51 36 42
2.0.42 1 15 60 34
Table 6.1: FindBugs warnings in Berkeley DB, Java Edition
first time. This hypothesis was confirmed, as more than half of the warnings re-
ported in version 1.5.0 were removed in version 1.7.1. This is strong confirmation
that the issues reported by FindBugs were deemed to be worth fixing by the de-
velopers. Over the versions of the software we examined, we observed 74 removed
warnings. Among the warnings removed were:
• 12 Inconsistent Synchronization warnings
• 3 Double Checked Locking warnings
• 10 Hashcode/Equals warnings
• 5 Redundant Null Check warnings
• 5 Dead Local Stores
• 1 Read Return warning
The presence of warnings related to possible synchronization bugs is significant,
since the software supports concurrency.
Overall, this case study was a useful validation of the usefulness of FindBugs in
a real software development project, and of the usefulness of our warning matching
techniques. In the future, we plan to study the effects of using FindBugs on the
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development of larger systems. Our goals include characterizing what bugs can be
found with static analysis compared to other techniques, and improving the accuracy
of static analysis by identifying long-lived warnings likely to be false positives.
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Chapter 7
Related Work
In this chapter, we describe related work on static analysis to find bugs in software.
7.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis techniques are used to extract properties from a program by analyzing
its code. Because nontrivial properties of programs are undecidable in general, the
results of static analysis are usually approximate. Unlike forms of analysis relying
on program execution, such as testing and program instrumentation, static analysis
can infer properties about all possible executions of a program.
7.1.1 General Static Analysis Techniques
One of the first general frameworks for static analysis was dataflow analysis, intro-
duced by Kildall [46]. Dataflow analysis tracks dataflow facts at points in the control
flow graph of a procedure. The dataflow facts form a lattice. Given a dataflow fact
for the entry to a control flow graph, the dataflow analysis algorithm computes
facts at all points within the graph. The effects of basic blocks are computed using
transfer functions, which summarize the effects of instructions in basic blocks. A
meet function is used to combine dataflow facts at control join points. The anal-
ysis iterates by propagating dataflow facts through basic blocks and along control
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edges until a fixpoint is reached. Kildall proved that given a fixed height lattice
and monotone transfer functions, dataflow analysis is guaranteed to terminate and
produce correct results. The results are an approximation of the real behavior of
the procedure. Dataflow analysis is relatively inexpensive to perform (usually linear
in the size of the control flow graph), and almost any analysis property can be for-
mulated as a dataflow problem. However, the loss of information at join points in
dataflow analysis results in lost precision. In our work on FindBugs, we have used
dataflow analysis extensively to find properties such as the types of variables, which
variables may contain a null value, which program statements are covered by locks,
and many others.
Abstract interpretation, introduced by Cousot and Cousot [12], was developed
to provide a firmer theoretical foundation for dataflow analysis. An abstraction
functionmaps the infinite domain of program objects into a finite domain of abstract
objects. The effects of program operations are modeled using the abstract domain.
A concretization function maps the abstract objects back into the program domain
(with some loss of precision). Dataflow analysis can be considered a special case of
abstract interpretation.
ASTLOG [13] is a language for specifying patterns to match the abstract
syntax trees of C and C++ programs. Unlike dataflow analysis and abstract inter-
pretation, this kind of analysis does not directly model the semantics of program
operations, focusing entirely on syntactic structures. Even given this limitation,
ASTLOG has been used successfully to find bugs and performance problems, and
is the basis of the PREfast tool used extensively within Microsoft to find bugs.
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ASTLOG is an interesting data point in the space of static analysis techniques to
find bugs, because it shows that simple pattern-matching approaches can be very
effective at finding interesting program features, such as probable bugs. The bug
detectors in FindBugs implemented as a sequential scan over bytecode instructions
using a state-machine recognizer are similar to the approach used in ASTLOG in
many respects. The main difference is that we have not codified a language to de-
scribe these recognizers, relying instead on a visitor-based implementation strategy.
Liu et. al. [51] describe an algorithm for matching regular queries on nodes in
a control flow graph. Nodes may be matched against constructors, which represent
the meaning of the node. For example, the constructor def might indicate that the
node defines the value of a variable. Nodes may also be matched against symbols,
which represent variables or literal values referenced by the node. For example, the
expression def(a) would represent a definition of a variable to be referred to as a
in the query. All occurrences of a particular symbol in the query must match the
same underlying variable or constant. Constructors and symbols may be formed into
regular expressions with wildcards, repetition, and negation. Queries are executed
at a given start node v0, and the results of the query are pairs (v, θ) where v
is a node such that a sequence of symbols from v0 to v matches the query, and
θ is a map of symbols used in the query to variables and constants matched by
those symbols. Variations of the algorithm are presented for both existential and
universal queries, which are analogous to may and must formulations of dataflow
analysis. The authors present a number of standard dataflow analyses expressed as
parametric path queries, as well as formulations of checkers for correctness properties
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such as lock ordering and correct ordering of file I/O operations. One limitation of
parametric path queries is the reliance on matching symbol names to variable names
in order to express data dependences; there is no simple way to extend this matching
to heap objects. However, because many interesting bugs may be found through
local analysis, parametric path queries could serve a very useful purpose for concisely
expressing local correctness properties. In the future we intend to explore the use
of regular path queries as a replacement for the ad-hoc visitor-based bug detectors
in FindBugs. We believe that they would provide a concise and flexible way to
express recognizers for many kinds of bug patterns, and might allow users to add
domain-specific bug detectors more easily.
7.1.2 Static Analysis to Find Bugs
The literature concerning static analysis techniques to find bugs is very extensive.
This section only attempts to summarize a few of the most relevant works.
Lint [45], the ancestor of all program checkers, was designed to find common
C programming errors. Due to the limited CPU and memory resources available
at the time of its implementation, the analysis performed by lint is simplistic. For
example, lint checks for uses of uninitialized local variables by seeing if they are
assigned earlier in the source file than their first use, rather than using a more
sophisticated analysis (such as dataflow analysis). Due to the imprecision of lint’s
analysis, special annotation comments may be added to the program’s source code to
suppress false warnings. Many checks performed by lint are now built into modern
C compilers. FindBugs very much falls within the category of Lint-like program
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analysis tools. However, because of the much greater computing power available
today, it uses more powerful analysis techniques, such as dataflow analysis. Because
FindBugs analyzes Java rather than C, it focuses less on low-level bugs, such as
memory allocation and dereferencing errors, and more on higher level concerns,
such as API use.
LCLint [26] is a static analysis tool to detect errors in C programs. For pro-
grams with no specifications, LCLint works much like the original lint tool, warning
about common C programming mistakes. For programs with specifications, LCLint
checks the code for consistency with the specifications. Examples of properties
checked by LCLint include incorrect use of boolean values, abstraction violations
(such as incorrect use of a “private” element of a struct), and violations of temporal
properties (such as using a field before it is initialized). Subsequent work extended
LCLint to check for memory errors [25], such as failure to free allocated memory and
use of uninitialized memory, and security exploits [27], such as buffer overruns and
format string vulnerabilities. The analysis performed by LCLint is neither sound nor
complete. However, explicit specifications help to make the analysis more precise in
cases where properties cannot be inferred by analysis alone. The null pointer anno-
tations in FindBugs (described in Section 3.3.10) were inspired by LCLint, and our
study of bugs in student programming projects confirm the value of specifications
in finding bugs.
Warlock [65] is a lint-like static analysis tool to find race conditions in C pro-
grams. Each source file of a program is analyzed to determine which mutex locks
are used to protect variable accesses. Variables not protected by a consistent lock
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(or set of locks) are flagged. The analysis is inter-procedural; functions with no
callers are assumed to be call graph roots. Imprecision in the analysis is mitigated
through the use of annotations, which can be used to describe the locks intended to
protect particular variables, which sections of code are multithreaded, which func-
tions might be called through a function pointer, etc. The detector for inconsistent
synchronization in FindBugs uses a somewhat similar approach; however, it relies
on the common Java idiom of locking an object in order to protect its fields, and
does not handle the more general case where any object might be used to protect a
particular memory location.
PREfix [9] applies static analysis to find common dynamic errors in C and
C++ programs. Examples of errors detected by PREfix are invalid pointer accesses,
leaked memory, use of freed memory, and use of an invalid resource (such as a file or
window handle). The analysis performed by PREfix works by symbolically executing
a large number of paths through the program, tracking the state of variables and
memory. PREfix works inter-procedurally, starting at the call graph leaves and
working towards the roots. It analyzes functions by evaluating a large number
of paths through their control flow graphs. To a significant degree, the values of
expressions are tracked using predicates, to avoid analyzing infeasible paths. As
functions are analyzed, models are built for later use when calls to those functions are
encountered. Constraints are added to functions to detect situations such as passing
a null pointer to a function which dereferences it unconditionally. PREfix was able to
find significant numbers of errors in large software systems with a low (25% or less)
false positive rate. The authors noted that a large amount of implementation effort
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was required to present detected errors to the user in a meaningful way. PREfix is
a good example of a “deep” analysis to find bugs. In our work on FindBugs, we
have focused largely on bugs which can be found using local analysis. One of the
surprising conclusions of our work is that a significant number of serious bugs can
be found without deep analysis.
MC [20, 36] (Meta-Compilation) is an inter-procedural static analysis system
for analyzing C and C++ programs. The novel aspect of MC is the use of a language,
called Metal, to describe the properties checked by the analysis. Metal is based on
a syntactic pattern matching technique similar to ASTLOG. Syntactic patterns are
used to describe functions and data objects of interest to the analysis. The MC sys-
tem uses state machines to describe temporal correctness properties. For example,
a lock object can be in unlocked or locked states. The analysis creates new state
machine instances as interesting objects are encountered. Syntactic patterns specify
when state transitions should occur; for example, calling a lock function changes
the state of the lock. Some state transitions represent bugs, such as locking a non-
recursive lock object already in the locked state. The analysis also has the notion
of global state to describe global properties such as whether or not interrupts are
enabled. The analysis is inter-procedural, starting at the call graph roots and work-
ing towards the leaves. Aggressive caching and memoization of function effects are
used to make the analysis more efficient, at the expense of accuracy and correctness.
Within functions, the analysis is path sensitive, using knowledge of variable states
to avoid analyzing false paths. MC is similar to PREfix in many respects. Its main
innovation is providing a generic framework for expressing and checking correctness
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properties. Our work on FindBugs focuses on a somewhat different class of bugs,
although there are areas of overlap.
RacerX [21] is a static analysis system to find deadlocks and data races in mul-
tithreaded software. The techniques employed by RacerX are very similar to those
used in Warlock; lock sets are tracked at all program points. Variables not accessed
with a consistent lock set are potential data races. In order for the analyzed system
to be free of deadlocks, an acquisition of a lock l implies an ordering constraint that
all locks in the current lock set must be acquired before l. Based on all observed
constraints, RacerX computes the transitive closure and emits potential deadlock
warnings for any detected cycles. The analysis used is very similar to MC; however,
variables are not tracked to eliminate false paths. To reduce the impact of false
positives due to imprecision in the analysis, the authors employ a wide variety of
heuristics. One novel technique is unlockset analysis, which computes locks known
not to be held using a backwards analysis. Unlocksets are used to increase confi-
dence in the accuracy of locksets; when the unlockset disagrees with the lockset, the
most likely explanation is that an analysis error wrongly concluded that a lock was
held. RacerX also uses heuristics to rank the warnings produced by detected data
races. For example, unsynchronized variable accesses or unlocked function calls are
ranked higher if they are the first or last statement in a critical section, since those
accesses are most likely to be intentionally protected by the lock, and not merely
coincidentally locked. The authors used RacerX to find a number of deadlocks and
data races in Linux, FreeBSD, and a commercial OS kernel. FindBugs also has de-
tectors for data races and deadlocks. However, they detect a more limited subset of
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cases. For example, FindBugs only detects data races related to the common idiom
of locking an object to protect access to its fields. Deadlock detection in FindBugs
is limited to identifying locations where a wait is performed with two locks held.
What is interesting in FindBugs is that simple analysis techniques can reveal serious
bugs.
7.2 Ranking Techniques
Almost all useful bug checkers produce some false warnings. If the ratio of false
warnings to real bugs found is too high, using the tool may be unproductive. One
way to mitigate the impact of false warnings is to use ad-hoc heuristics to identify
and suppress probable false warnings. A more general way of dealing with false
warnings is for the tool to produce a ranking in which the warnings likely to be
genuine are ranked higher than the warnings likely to be false. Even if the ratio of
false warnings is very high, the existence of a good ranking allows the tool to be
used productively. Warnings are inspected in order of their rank, with the warnings
most likely to be real bugs inspected first. The inspection continues until the false
positive ratio becomes too high.
Z-ranking [48] is a statistical technique proposed by Kremenek and Engler
for ranking static analysis warnings. The technique works in the context of static
bug checkers which analyze many possible paths through a program, which means
that each program location will generally be checked many times. Z-ranking is
based on the intuition that programmers usually write correct code, so at any given
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program location, the correctness property being checked will usually hold. Thus, if
a property seldom or never checks as correct at a given location, it is likely that the
violation is the result of an invalid static analysis decision rather than a real bug.
The authors evaluated Z-ranking on several bug checkers, and showed it to be up to
10 times more effective than random ranking at distinguishing real errors from false
warnings. An interesting limitation of Z-ranking is that because of the “no success”
hypothesis, it treats genuine bugs which result in failed checks on all program paths
as false positives. The authors argue that testing should uncover such bugs, since
they would manifest on any path to the location.
FeedbackRank [47] is another ranking technique proposed by Kremenek and
Engler, which works by exploiting the locality of real bugs and false positives. The
technique is based on the observation that both real bugs and false warnings tend
to cluster. For example, real bugs may cluster because a programmer unaware of a
correctness requirement violated it repeatedly while working on a particular function
or module. False warnings might cluster because an incorrect static analysis decision
resulted in cascading errors. FeedbackRank divides warnings into populations by
locality: in the paper, the authors used functions, modules, and leaf directories
(packages) as the basis for assigning warnings to populations. As the user classifies
warnings as genuine or false, a Bayesian network models the influence of membership
in the different kinds of populations on the likelihood that a warning is false. A novel
feature of FeedbackRank is that the model is updated after each user classification;
in this way, the model adapts to the particular bug distribution patterns of the
code artifact being analyzed. The authors found that FeedbackRank performed
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between 2–8 times better than random ranking at distinguishing real bugs from
false warnings. In addition, the authors show evidence that as an evolving code
artifact is repeatedly analyzed and the new static analysis warnings ranked, the
model should reach a steady state where the ranking effectiveness is maximized. A
nice feature of FeedbackRank is that unlike Z-ranking, it does not depend in any
way on the static analysis used to produce the warnings. Instead, it relies only on
correlations among the warnings in different populations. The authors note that
the locality is only one possible way to divide warnings into populations, and that
other sources of correlation could be exploited.
We have not yet explored general ranking techniques in FindBugs. Instead,
we have used ad-hoc techniques to suppress likely false positives.
7.3 Verification Techniques
The ultimate goal of techniques to ensure software quality is to guarantee the ab-
sence of bugs. Research has made significant progress towards this goal, although
complete proofs of correctness are generally too expensive to apply to large systems.
Partial verification techniques have been used successfully to show that programs
have particular correctness properties.
Verification techniques are, in our opinion, complimentary to unsound bug
checking tools like FindBugs. Verification of some program properties is a desirable
goal. However, full verification of all correctness properties is not feasible in general,
especially given the absence of precise specifications for most programs.
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Axiomatic proof techniques [37] were prosed by Hoare as a means of establish-
ing the correctness of programs. The axioms used are similar to those in arithmetic,
with the important caveat that computer arithmetic is finite. Based on the syntac-
tic forms of program statements, schemata may be applied to form axioms formally
defining the meaning of those statements. An axiom defining a program statement
S takes the form P{S}Q, where P is the assertion of the statement’s preconditions
and Q is the assertion of the statement’s postconditions. Deductive rules allow in-
troduction of new theorems based on those already proved; in this way, reasoning
about the meaning of a single statement can be extended to a sequence of state-
ments, loops, procedures, and eventually the entire program. Such proofs do not
guarantee termination; instead, they guarantee a correct result in the event that the
program does terminate. Hoare notes that the complexity of the schemata defining
the meanings of program statements is directly related to the complexity of the
underlying language. For this reason, axiomatic proof techniques would be diffi-
cult to apply to a language in which statements have side effects other than local
assignment.
Extended Static Checking (ESC) [17, 49] is a system which uses formal proof
techniques to find bugs in software. Its analysis is based on specifications, which
take the form of program annotations. A variety of properties are checked, including
procedure preconditions and postconditions, object invariants, temporal correctness
properties of object interfaces, out of bounds array accesses, and incorrect synchro-
nization. An automatic theorem prover is used to check the program’s specifications
against its implementation. The analysis is designed to be modular: invariants are
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specified for the interface to a particular class or module which can then be checked
for all uses of the interface. In many respects, ESC can be seen as a verification tech-
nique, rather than a static analysis. However, ESC has several sources of imprecision
which lead to unsoundness. For example, loop iterations are only analyzed to a fi-
nite depth. The approach we have taken in FindBugs contrasts strongly with ESC.
ESC attempts to prove a variety of correctness properties over the entire program.
In essence, ESC considers the program incorrect until proved correct. FindBugs
attempts to identify code where an error is likely to exist—considering code to be
correct unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. We believe that this
distinction is a very important factor in adoption for static analysis tools. Because
errors are rare, programmers are not likely to embrace a tool that creates extra work
in the common case.
CQual [31, 60, 32] uses type qualifiers as a means to annotate C programs to
check particular correctness properties. Type qualifiers add properties to the existing
programming language types; for example, a “tainted” qualifier might indicate data
from an untrusted source that must be sanitized before being passed to a trusted
sink. Qualified types have a subtype relationship with plain types. For example,
for a type T , T ⊆ tainted T . CQual provides efficient automatic inference of type
qualifiers based on constraints generated by program statements. Because types
are familiar to programmers, and are efficient to check, type qualifiers represent a
practical lightweight verification technique based on specifications. However, type
qualifiers do not have the expressive power of full axiomatic semantics. The authors
of CQual used it to infer possible locations where const qualifiers could be added
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[31], to find format string vulnerabilities [60], and to find locking bugs in the Linux
kernel [32].
ESP [15] is a system for partial verification of software. Rather than proving
that the program is entirely correct, it checks that a single temporal correctness
property holds. ESP uses a novel technique to avoid losing information at control
joins by discarding states that do not affect the property being checked. This gives
ESP path sensitivity without (in most cases) an exponential increase in the number
of states that need to be tracked. The ESP algorithm is sound but not complete; it
always rejects programs which do not have the property being verified, but may fail
to prove the correctness of programs which are actually correct. The authors used
ESP to prove that all file handles allocated in the GNU C compiler are used safely.
In the future we may explore adopting a similar approach for making some of the
intra-procedural analysis performed by FindBugs path-sensitive.
Model checking is a technique for exploring reachable states in a concurrent
system for errors. It was initially developed for verification of hardware systems;
recent research has applied it to software systems. The SLAM project [6, 5] applies
model checking to boolean abstractions of programs. For predicates in a C program,
boolean predicates are abstracted such that if a property is true of the boolean
program, it will also be true of the original C program. The boolean abstraction of
the original program is done incrementally; if the desired property cannot be proved,
new predicates are added and the boolean program checked again. The authors used
SLAM to verify that several Windows NT device drivers were free of certain kinds
of locking errors.
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7.4 Extraction of Specifications from Programs
Static analysis techniques to find bugs must be based on some notion of what dis-
tinguishes correct program behavior from incorrect behavior. Sometimes, a priori
knowledge of language semantics are sufficient to suggest properties to check for.
However, bug finding techniques benefit significantly from specifications of expected
behavior, as can be seen in the number of bug patterns implemented in FindBugs
related to incorrect use of APIs, and the number of serious occurrences of those
patterns in production software. Recent work has developed techniques for auto-
matically inferring specifications from software.
The authors of the MC system developed a technique called belief inference
[22] for deriving system-specific rules. Belief inference is based on the observation
that almost all program statements have a set of beliefs about their preconditions
and postconditions. For example, dereferencing a pointer implies the belief that
the pointer is non-null. Using belief inference, the authors of MC were able to
develop two general strategies for automatically inferring errors. First, consistency
checking works by flagging pairs of operations whose beliefs contradict. One of the
conflicting operations must be an error, even if it is not known which one is incorrect.
Statistical analysis works by generating a number of hypotheses and checking the
code for evidence to support or refute the hypotheses. An example hypothesis is
“variable v is protected by lock l.” A statistical technique, z-ranking, is used to
rank the confidence that a particular violation of a hypothesis is an error. Through
checkers based on belief inference techniques, the authors were able to find hundreds
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of bugs in Linux and OpenBSD, some of which were violations of hypotheses about
program correctness that the authors did not know in advance.
Daikon [24, 23] is a system for inferring likely invariants from the dynamic
behavior of a program. At procedure entry and exit points, and (optionally) loop
heads, Daikon infers candidate invariants. These may take the form of expressions
of equality, inequality, or relations between program variables and constants or other
variables, sequence ordering, sequence relations, or sequence membership. As the
program executes, the values of program variables are recorded. As a post-processing
step, candidate invariants are checked, and if falsified, removed from consideration.
The invariants inferred by Daikon can be used as a first step in constructing a
correctness proof using axiomatic techniques. The authors used Daikon to generate
specifications to be checked by ESC/Java [53, 54]. For several small- and medium-
sized Java programs, Daikon was able to infer about 90% of the invariants needed
for the programs to pass the checker without warnings. This approach is noteworthy
in that it uses the dynamic behavior of a program to infer a significant number of
the specifications and invariants needed to verify aspects of its correctness.
Houdini [30] is an “annotation assistant” for ESC/Java. Like Daikon, it pro-
poses candidate invariants at certain program points. Rather than using dynamic
behavior to eliminate false invariants, it uses ESC/Java’s theorem prover to prove
or refute the invariants. Based on the theorem prover’s output, refuted annotations
are removed and the theorem prover run again. The process terminates when all of
the annotations added by Houdini are accepted by the theorem prover. Compared
to Daikon, Houdini has the advantage of not requiring a test suite in order to work.
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The authors found that Houdini significantly reduced the amount of effort needed
to annotate a program to successfully pass through ESC/Java with no warnings.
Specification mining [2] is a technique for extracting temporal correctness prop-
erties from traces recording uses of an API or abstract data type. The specifications
produced could be used to find bugs using model checking or static analysis. Traces
are produced by instrumenting the functions or methods implementing the API or
ADT to record the name of the call and the identities of data objects. Specification
mining requires that the specifications for interaction with the API or ADT have the
form of a regular language. Since in general many APIs do not have this property,
specification mining extracts interaction scenarios, which are subtraces which are
regular. In addition to representing protocol states, the scenarios also convey data
dependences based on the objects participating in the interaction. The interaction
scenarios are fed to a probabilistic finite state automaton learner, which constructs
PFSAs from the scenarios. The authors used specification mining to successfully
extract protocol state machines for Unix socket calls and the X Window System
selection API.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
In our work, we have made progress toward characterizing the software defects that
can be found using simple static analysis techniques in programs written in type-
safe object-oriented languages, such as Java. Our hypothesis that many bugs share
common features and arise from similar causes has proved to be a productive way
to explore the space of easily-detectable defects. By starting from real examples of
bugs, and then researching analysis techniques to find them, we have developed a
static analysis tool, FindBugs, which has found a large number of bugs in production
software artifacts. We have conducted empirical studies to measure the effectiveness
and accuracy of FindBugs on both production software and student programming
projects. For student projects, we have been able to determine which bugs are
not found by static analysis, and discovered many possible ways to improve the
effectiveness and accuracy of the underlying analysis. FindBugs has been widely
adopted by commercial organizations and open source projects. Given this success,
it is clear that simple, bug-driven static analysis can play a useful role in maintaining
and improving software quality.
At a higher level, we have gained a better understanding of why bugs occur in
the first place, and have documented many common causes of errors. These insights
suggest possible language or API improvements. In addition, characterizing defects
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that can be found using simple analysis techniques provides a context for work on
more sophisticated analysis techniques.
We have several ideas for future work. We would like to continue our study
of student programming projects, in order to find out if they contain more bugs
that would be easy targets for static analysis. We would also like to investigate
application-specific bugs patterns. Our work so far has focused on generic bug
patterns that could affect any software. However, all software contains internal APIs
and invariants which are not checked for correct use. Bugs arising from misuse of
internal invariants would be a good target for static analysis. Given the success of
null pointer annotations at finding bugs in student projects, we feel it would be worth
investigating other uses of annotations. Another topic for future work is studying
the benefits and costs of using more sophisticated analysis. Many commercial static
analysis tools are advertised as performing deep, inter-procedural analysis. It would
be interesting to see how many additional bugs they find. Finally, we would like to
fully integrate FindBugs into the development process of a large software project.
This would allow us to find out with greater confidence which bugs found by static
analysis are judged to be worth fixing. It might also shed some light on the relative
effectiveness of static analysis at finding bugs, as opposed to other techniques, such
as testing. This would allow us to gain a better understanding of the economic costs
and benefits of using static analysis to find bugs.
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Appendix A
Description of Bug Patterns
This appendix describes each bug pattern listed in Section 2.2.
A.1 Correctness Patterns
AM: Empty jar or zip file entry. A loop creates Jar or Zip file entries without
writing any data to those entries.
BC: Impossible cast. A cast is guaranteed to fail, or an instanceof check is
guaranteed to evaluate to false. This bug is surprisingly common in code written
by novice programmers.
BIT: Incompatible bit masks. An expression involving a comparison of values
computed using bitwise arithmetic is guaranteed to evaluate to a boolean constant.
If the boolean is used for control flow, dead code may result. Such errors may
indicate that the wrong constant and/or operators were used in the expression.
BRSA: Bad ResultSet access. A value is fetched from or stored to a ResultSet
object using an index value of 0. Because ResultSet values are indexed starting at
one, an exception will be thrown.
CN: Class implements Cloneable, but does not implement clone(). Classes
which implement the Cloneable interface should override the clone() method in
order to make it visible to callers.
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CN: Clone method does not call super.clone(). All clone() methods should
delegate to their parent class’s clone() method in order to create the new object.
This serves two purposes: it guarantees that an object of the correct runtime type
will be created, and it also guarantees that superclass fields will be initialized cor-
rectly.
Co: Covariant compareTo() method. Classes which implement the Comparable
interface must define a compareTo() method which takes an argument of type
Object. Classes which implement a covariant version of compareTo() cannot be
called through the Comparable interface.
DE: Dropped exception. A method with an empty exception handler may un-
intentionally discard exceptions which should be re-thrown, logged, or reported to
the user.
DLS: Dead local store. A value is computed and stored in a local variable, but
the stored value is never used. If the stored value is an object, it may be the case
that the object was intended to be used in some way, but due to an oversight was
not used.
DMI: Passing invalid constant value for a month. Methods which take an
integer representing a month (such as the set() methods of java.util.Calendar)
require the value to be in the range 0..11, rather than the more usual range 1..12.
Dm: Method calls runFinalizersOnExit(). Calling runFinalizersOnExit() (in
either the System or Runtime classes) may cause finalizers to be executed on live
objects, resulting in state corruption, deadlocks, and many other problems.
EC: Invoking equals() on an array object. Array objects inherit the equals()
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method from the base Object class, which works by checking reference equality.
Programmers may incorrectly expect equals() to compare array contents.
EC: Calling equals() on unrelated types. The contract for the equals()
method states that it should return false if the types of the objects compared
do not match exactly. If the argument to equals() is an object which can be stat-
ically determined to be of a different type, then it should be guaranteed to return
false at runtime.
Eq: Covariant equals() method. A covariant equals() method does not over-
ride the base Object.equals() method, and thus cannot be called from container
classes and other contexts where the object is referred to by a supertype reference.
FE: Equality comparison of floating point values. Code that compares float-
ing point values using the == or != operators may produce unexpected results at
runtime because these operators are inherently imprecise. Most comparisons of
floating point values should be done using the <, >, <=, and >= operators.
FI: Explicit invocation of finalizer. Finalizer methods should not be called
directly; they should only be executed by the virtual machine.
FI: Finalizer does not call super.finalize(). Subclasses should ensure that
superclass finalizer actions are performed by calling super.finalize() in their
finalize() methods.
HE: Equal objects should have equal hashcodes. Classes must ensure that
objects that compare as equal using the equals() method must have the same hash
code. Otherwise, they will not work correctly in Hashtable and HashMap objects.
ICAST: Invalid integer shift. An integer shift should be within the range 0..31.
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ICAST: Integer division result cast to double. In integer division, the result
is truncated. If the result of an integer division is cast to double, this suggests that
the lost precision was meant to be retained.
ICAST: Integer value cast to double, then passed to Math.ceil(). Because
an integer value has no fractional part, the call to Math.ceil() is effectively a no-op.
This suggests that the integer value should have been a float or double.
IL: A container is added to itself. Adding a reference to a container object to
itself will result in a stack overflow if the hashCode() method is called on the con-
tainer, since the hash code of a container depends on the hash code of its elements.
IL: Infinite recursive loop. A method invokes itself unconditionally, or invokes
itself recursively passing the original parameters as arguments. This will result in a
stack overflow exception.
IM: Integer multiplication of result of integer remainder. Multiplying the
result of an integer remainder by an integer constant may indicate operator prece-
dence confusion.
IMSE: Dubious catching of IllegalMonitorStateException. A correct lock-
ing discipline should always ensure that monitor operations (such as wait() and
notify()) are only performed when the thread holds a lock on the monitor. Any
time code which explicitly catches IllegalMonitorStateException is seen, it is al-
most certain to be compensating for an error elsewhere, and may indicate a general
misunderstanding of the semantics of wait() and notify().
IP: A parameter is dead upon entry to method but overwritten. While it
is arguably legitimate to conditionally assign a value to a parameter, it is poor style
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to write to a parameter whose original value is never read. Often, such cases are
unintentional, and indicate an error.
It: Iterator next() method can’t throw NoSuchElementException. The
next()method of an Iterator class cannot throw NoSuchElementException, which
it is required to do if there are no more elements to return. This may mean that
the iterator object can walk off the end of a data structure.
J2EE: Store of non serializable object into HttpSession. An object which
does not implement Serializable is stored in an HttpSession. If the session is
passivated, the object will not be stored.
NP: Null pointer dereference in method. A variable containing the null value
is dereferenced, which results in a NullPointerException being thrown.
NP: Possible null pointer dereference in method. A variable which may
contain a null value is dereferenced. If full branch coverage of the method is possible,
a NullPointerException can be thrown.
NP: equals() method does not check for null parameter. An equals()
method dereferences its parameter unconditionally. However, the contract defined
by Object.equals() requires all equals() methods to return false if passed a
null value.
NP: Immediate dereference of the result of readLine(). The readLine()
method in BufferedReader returns null when there are no more lines to read.
Dereferencing the return value of readLine() without first checking to ensure that
it is not null could result in a NullPointerException.
NP: Passing null for unconditionally dereferenced parameter. A null value
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is passed to a method which will dereference it unconditionally, resulting in a
NullPointerException at runtime.
NP: Read of unwritten field. A value is loaded from a field and derefer-
enced, even though no value is ever written to that field. This will result in a
NullPointerException.
NS: Questionable use of non-short-circuit logic. A non-short-circuiting bit-
wise & or | operator is used with boolean values, rather than integer values. Often,
the programmer intended to use a short-circuiting boolean operator (&& or ||).
Nm: Class defines equal(), not equals(). Defining a method called “equal” is
usually a failed attempt to override equals().
Nm: Confusing method names. Two method names differ only by capitaliza-
tion. This may indicate a failed attempt to override a method in a superclass or
interface.
Nm: Class defines hashcode(), not hashCode(). An all-lower-case hashcode()
method does not override Object.hashCode().
Nm: Class defines tostring(), not toString(). An all-lower-case tostring()
method does not override Object.toString().
ODR: Method may fail to close database resource. A method creates a
database resource, such as a ResultSet, but does not close it on all paths out of
the method. This may degrade application performance, or cause the application
to run out of handles to database resources.
OS: Method may fail to close stream. A method opens an input or output
stream, but does not close it on all paths out of the method. This may cause the
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application to run out of file handles, and if the stream is buffered, could result in
data not to be written.
QF: Complicated, subtle or wrong increment in for-loop. The variable
incremented by a for loop is different than the variable initialized and checked by
the loop. This may cause the loop to fail to terminate.
RC: Suspicious reference comparison. Two references of a String, Integer, or
similar class are compared by reference equality. Usually, instances of these classes
should be compared using the equals() method, which compares the contents of
the objects for equality.
RCN: Redundant comparison of non-null value to null. A value known to
be non-null is compared to null. Although sometimes this is just defensive program-
ming, it might indicate more serious confusion on the part of the programmer.
RCN: Redundant comparison of two null values. A value known to be null is
compared to null. Although sometimes this is just defensive programming, it might
indicate more serious confusion on the part of the programmer.
RCN: Nullcheck of value previously dereferenced. A value which is not
known to be definitely non-null is dereferenced and then checked for null. This
often indicates that the code was modified incorrectly by inserting a dereference
before a null check. If it is possible for a value to be null, it should be checked before
the dereference.
RE: Invalid syntax for regular expression. A Pattern object is created from
a constant string which does not encode a valid regular expression, resulting in a
PatternSyntaxException being thrown at runtime.
132
RR: Method ignores results of InputStream.read(). A read() method is
called on an input stream, passed a byte array, but the return value is not checked.
The call may return fewer bytes than requested, and if the caller does not check the
return value, it may get out of sync with the stream, and uninitialized data in the
byte array may be used.
RR: Method ignores results of InputStream.skip(). Like read(), the skip()
method of InputStream classes may return fewer bytes than requested, and needs
to be checked by the caller.
RV: Random value from 0 to 1 coerced to 0. When a random floating point
value in the range 0..1 is coerced to an integer, the result is certainly 0. This may
indicate that the Random.nextInt(n) method should have been called.
RV: Checking if result of String.indexOf() is positive. The indexOf() meth-
ods of the String class return a negative number when a matching substring is not
found. Checking to see if this value is positive does not handle the case where a
match is found at the beginning of the string.
RV: Discarding result of readLine() after checking if it is nonnull. After
checking that the value returned from readLine() is non-null, the value is not used.
RV: Method ignores return value. Many methods in the core Java libraries
only serve a useful purpose if their return value is checked. For example, all of the
methods which transform a String object return a new object as a result, leaving
the original unmodified. Failing to check the return value of such methods often
means that the programmer did not understand this subtlety.
SA: Self assignment of field. A value is read from a field, and then immediately
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assigned to the same field. This almost certainly indicates a typo.
Se: Instance field in serializable class not serializable. A class is declared as
Serializable, but one or more of its instance fields are not of a type guaranteed to
be serializable. If a non-serializable object is stored in one of these fields, the object
cannot be properly serialized.
Se: serialVersionUID declared incorrectly. A serialVersionUID field either
is not of type long, is not static, or is not public. As such, it does not actually
declare a serial version UID for purposes of serialization.
Se: Parent of Serializable class has no void constructor. A class implements
the Serializable interface and its superclass does not. When such an object is
deserialized, the fields of the superclass need to be initialized by invoking the void
constructor of the superclass. Since the superclass does not have one, serialization
and deserialization will fail at runtime.
Se: Externalizable class has no void constructor. A class implements the
Externalizable interface, but does not define a void constructor. When external-
izable objects are deserialized, they first need to be constructed by invoking the void
constructor. Since this class does not have one, serialization and deserialization will
fail at runtime.
SnVI: Class is Serializable, but doesn’t define serialVersionUID. A class
implementing Serializable does not define a serial version UID, so the virtual
machine will create an implicit UID as a hash of the fields and methods of the class.
However, because this hash includes synthetic fields and methods, its value depends
on the source to bytecode compiler used, creating compatibility problems if the class
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is recompiled.
UCF: Useless control flow. The targets of both the if and else branches of an
if statement are the same. A common typo (putting a semicolon after the guard
of an if statement) is often the cause.
UR: Uninitialized read of field in constructor. An instance field is read in a
constructor before any value has been assigned to the field; this will result in a null
value being read. This may mean that the programmer forgot to assign a value to
field, possibly due to typo.
UwF: Field only ever set to null. All writes to a field set its value to null. This
may indicate that a constructor or initialization method was supposed to initialize
the field, but did not.
A.2 Multithreaded Correctness Patterns
DC: Double check of field. Programmers often use the double-checked lock-
ing pattern [59] to lazily initialize objects, in order to avoid acquiring a lock every
time the object is accessed. However, because of compiler and processor optimiza-
tions allowed by the Java Memory Model [40], the object may not be seen as fully
initialized.
Dm: Monitor wait() called on Condition. The wait() method is called on
a java.util.concurrent.Condition object. The programmer probably meant to
call await().
Dm: A thread was created using the default empty run method. A Thread
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object is created, but no Runnable object is passed to the thread, nor is an over-
loaded run() method defined. Therefore, the thread will do nothing when it is
started.
IS2: Inconsistent synchronization. A field of a class is sometimes, but not
always, accessed without a lock held on the object. This suggests that the program-
mer meant instances of the class to be safe for access by multiple threads (using the
common idiom that a lock is held on the object while its mutable state is accessed);
however, some accesses of the field were inadvertently left unsynchronized. As a
result, the code may contain data races.
JLM: Synchronization performed on java.util.concurrent Lock. Ordinary
monitor synchronization is performed on a java.util.concurrent.Lock object. It
is likely that the programmer was confused, since the purpose of Lock objects is to
allow explicit calls to lock() and unlock().
LI: Lazy initialization of static field. A static field is initialized lazily. If the
code is reachable by multiple threads at runtime, they may see an incompletely
initialized object, because no synchronization is performed.
ML: Method synchronizes on an updated field. A method synchronizes on
an object referenced from a field which is written more than once. This is unlikely
to have useful semantics, since different threads may be synchronizing on different
objects.
MWN: Mismatched notify(). Object.notify() is called on an object which is
not locked. An IllegalMonitorStateException will be thrown.
MWN: Mismatched wait(). Object.wait() is called on an object which is not
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locked. An IllegalMonitorStateException will be thrown.
NN: Naked notify in method. A call to notify() or notifyAll() was made
without any (apparent) accompanying modification to mutable object state. In
general, calling a notify method on a monitor is done because some condition another
thread is waiting for has become true. However, for the condition to be meaningful,
it must involve a heap object that is visible to both threads.
No: Using notify() rather than notifyAll() in method. A method calls
notify() rather than notifyAll(). Java monitors are often used for multiple
conditions. Calling notify() only wakes up one thread, meaning that the thread
woken up might not be the one waiting for the condition that the caller just satisfied.
RS: Class’s readObject() method is synchronized. A serializable class defines
a readObject() which is synchronized. By definition, an object created by deserial-
ization is only reachable by one thread, and thus there is no need for readObject() to
be synchronized. If the readObject() method itself is causing the object to become
visible to another thread, that is an example of very dubious coding style.
Ru: Invoking run() on a thread. This method explicitly invokes run() on an
object. In general, classes implement the Runnable interface because they are going
to have their run() method invoked in a new thread, in which case Thread.start()
is the right method to call.
SC: Constructor invokes Thread.start(). A constructor starts a thread. This
is likely to be wrong if the class is ever extended/subclassed, since the thread will
be started before the subclass constructor is started.
SP: Method spins on field. This method spins in a loop which reads a field. The
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compiler may legally hoist the read out of the loop, turning the code into an infinite
loop.
SWL: Method calls Thread.sleep() with a lock held. This method calls
Thread.sleep() with a lock held. This may result in very poor performance and
scalability, since other threads may be waiting to acquire the lock.
TLW: Wait with two locks held. Waiting on a monitor while two locks are held
may cause deadlock. Performing a wait only releases the lock on the object being
waited on, not any other locks.
UG: Unsynchronized get method, synchronized set method. This class
contains similarly-named get and set methods where the set method is synchronized
and the get method is not. This may result in incorrect behavior at runtime, as
callers of the get method will not necessarily see a consistent state for the object.
A.3 Malicious Code Patterns
EI: Returning reference to mutable object. Returning a reference to a mutable
object value stored in one of the object’s fields exposes the internal representation
of the object. If instances are accessed by untrusted code, unchecked changes to the
mutable object could compromise security or other important properties.
EI2: Incorporating reference to mutable object. A method stores a reference
to an externally mutable object into the internal representation of the object. If
instances are accessed by untrusted code, unchecked changes to the mutable object
could compromise security or other important properties.
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FI: Finalizer should be protected, not public. A class’s finalize() method
should have protected access, not public. Untrusted code could corrupt the state of
the program by calling the finalizer method directly.
MS: Storing mutable object into static field. A method stores a reference to
an externally mutable object into a static field. Unchecked changes to the mutable
object could compromise security or other important properties.
MS: Static field could be modified by untrusted code. A mutable static field
could be changed by malicious code or by accident from another package. Often,
this situation arises because of a typo; the field was meant to be declared as final,
but was not.
MS: Returning mutable array. A public static method returns a reference to
an array that is part of the static state of the class. Any code that calls this method
can freely modify the underlying array.
MS: Field is a mutable array. A final static field references an array and can
be accessed by malicious code or by accident from another package. This code can
freely modify the contents of the array.
MS: Field is a mutable Hashtable. A final static field references a Hashtable
and can be accessed by malicious code or by accident from another package. This
code can freely modify the contents of the Hashtable.
139
A.4 Performance Patterns
Dm: Method invokes dubious Boolean constructor. A method crates a new
instance of a Boolean object. This is wasteful because Boolean is an immutable
class. A better approach is to use the singleton Boolean.TRUE or Boolean.FALSE
objects.
Dm: Method allocates a boxed primitive just to call toString(). A new
boxed primitive object (Integer, Boolean, etc.) is created for the sole purpose
of calling its toString method. Each of these classes contains a static version of
toString() which converts a primitive value to a string directly.
Dm: Explicit garbage collection. A method invokes System.gc(), which causes
an immediate garbage collection. Because a full garbage collection can be expensive,
such calls can significantly harm performance, especially if they occur in a loop.
Dm: Method allocates an object, only to get the class object. A new object
is constructed for the sole purpose of getting its runtime Class object. The Class
object can be obtained more efficiently by accessing the class static pseudo-field.
Dm: Calling Random.nextDouble() to generate a random integer. Calling
Random.nextDouble(), multiplying it by a constant, and casting the result to an
int is less efficient that simply calling Random.nextInt().
Dm: Invoking dubious new String(String) constructor. A method creates a
new String object by invoking the constructor which takes another String. Since
strings are immutable, creating a new identical String object serves no purpose,
and waste time and memory.
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Dm: Method invokes toString() method on a String. Calling toString()
on a String object is a redundant operation.
Dm: Method invokes dubious new String() constructor. Creating a new
empty String using the default constructor is unnecessary, and wastes memory;
using the empty string constant ("") is a better idea, and is more clear.
FI: Empty finalizer method. A class defines an empty finalizer method. Because
it has no effect, it should be deleted.
FI: Finalizer does nothing but call superclass finalizer. A class defines a
finalizer method which does nothing but calls its parent class’s finalizer. Because it
has no effect, it should be deleted.
ITA: Method uses toArray() with zero-length array argument. Because the
Java collection classes carry no type information about their contents, the toArray()
method defined for collection classes must be passed an argument of the correct
runtime array type. If this array is not large enough to hold the entire contents
of the collection, a new array must be created. Passing a zero-length array to
toArray() forces the creation of a new array object.
SBSC: Method concatenates strings using + in a loop. A string value is built
in a loop by repeated concatenation using the + operator. This will likely require
the creation of a new StringBuffer or StringBuilder on every loop iteration.
In addition to the object-creation overhead, the buffer copying involved creates
quadratic complexity instead of linear (as would be the case if append() is called
on a single StringBuffer or StringBuilder.)
SIC: Inner class should be made static. An inner class does not use its embed-
141
ded reference to the object which created it. This reference makes the instances of
the class larger, and may keep the reference to the creator object alive longer than
necessary. If possible, the class should be made static.
SS: Unread final instance field. A final instance field is never read because its
value is a constant at compile time. It should be made static to avoid taking up
space in the object.
UrF: Unread field. A field is never read, and should be removed from the class.
UuF: Unused field. A field is never read or written, and should be removed from
the class.
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Appendix B
Deployment Issues
In order to make the greatest impact on software quality, software engineering tools
must be used as an ongoing part of the development process, so that bugs can be
found as early as possible. For a static analysis tool to fit into the development
process, several issues must be addressed:
• Usability
• Integration with existing tools and environments
• Handling false positives
B.1 Usability
Software developers have an enormous number of software engineering tools to
choose from. SourceForge [62] hosts over 14,000 open-source projects classified in
the “Software Development” category, and these compete with a wide variety of
commercial tools. Developers are also notoriously overworked, and have little time
to research and evaluate new tools. Therefore, in order to have a chance at being
adopted, any new tool must offer an clear and immediate benefit.
We have not conducted a formal usability study for FindBugs. However, based
on our own experience and feedback from users, we know of several factors which
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are important when a new static analysis tool is considered for adoption.
The tool should require minimal setup and configuration. Users have
little patience for complex installation or configuration procedures. In particular,
users should not have to compile the tool from source code (which is not uncommon
for open-source software), nor should they be required to edit configuration files or
environment variables in order for the software to run. While some configurability
is beneficial, it is important that the default settings for the tool are appropriate for
most users.
We have made sure that each FindBugs release can be executed immediately
after its distribution archive is unpacked. Running FindBugs is as simple as launch-
ing the tool’s GUI interface, choosing a set of Java class files, archives, or directories
to analyze, clicking a button, and reviewing the output. We have received positive
feedback about initial ease of use from users. One user writes:
I gave it a whirl on my company’s product and found some interesting
stuff. I like how easy it is to use, I just pointed it at the .jar file and also
where the sources live and voila—free code review.
The information presented to the user must be clear and compre-
hensive. A useful static analysis tool cannot simply assert the existence of a bug;
it must also provide enough detail to explain which parts of the code are incorrect,
and why. For some bugs, this may be fairly simple: for example, “There is a null
pointer dereference in Foo.java at line 200.” For more complex or subtle bugs, such
as race conditions, it is important to provide an explanation of the bug means, and
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to provide contextual details describing which parts of the code appear to be faulty.
FindBugs has a rich data model for warnings. The core of a warning is com-
posed of a the bug pattern type and a warning priority. The bug pattern type
specifies the bug pattern of which the code identified by the warning is a probable
occurrence. Each bug pattern type has a one or two paragraph description, which is
shown in the FindBugs GUI when a warning of that type is selected. The warning
priority indicates the severity of the warning and the confidence that the warning
represents a real bug. A high priority warning indicates high likelihood of a serious
bug. Medium priority warnings are also likely to be bugs, but may not represent
as severe a problem as high priority warnings. Low priority warnings are included
for the sake of completeness, but generally do not indicate real errors. (By default,
low priority warnings are not displayed, meaning users must explicitly request to
see them.)
Each warning is decorated by a number of warning attributes which provide
context information about the bug. Types of warning attributes include:
• Class: a class or interface
• Method: a method in a class or interface
• Field: a field of a class
• Source line: a range of one or more source lines
• Integer value
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Figure B.1: Screen shot of FindBugs GUI showing expansion of warning attributes
All warnings specify a class attribute. Warnings which identify likely bugs in exe-
cutable code always have a method attribute, indicating the method in which the
bug occurs, and also a source line attribute, indicating the affected source lines.
(Internally, source line attributes also record the bytecode offsets of the affected
instructions.)
Each warning attribute has a role, which may be used to elaborate the meaning
of the specified code feature or analysis fact. For example, method attributes may
have the role “called”, which indicates that the warning involves a call to the method.
This allows warnings to distinguish between code features specifying the location of
a warning and code features which are merely referenced by the warning.
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Figure B.2: Screen shot of FindBugs GUI showing source code for warning
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The FindBugs GUI displays warnings as elements in a tree view. The text of
a warning item is a brief synopsis of the warning. Each warning may be expanded
to display its attributes. Figures B.1 and B.2 show a warning and its attributes
being displayed in the FindBugs GUI. The warning shown describes a possible inter-
procedural null pointer dereference. The warning contains attributes specifying the
class, method, and source lines of a method call site where a possibly null value is
passed to a method which will unconditionally dereference it. The “Details” window
shows a brief description of the bug, and the “Source Code” window displays the
relevant source code. Another method attribute specifies which method is called at
the call site: the user may click on this attribute to show the source code for the
called method. An integer value attribute specifies which argument passed to the
method is possibly null at the call site.
Users must be able to find the information they are most interested
in. Static analysis tools must provide an effective way for the user to find the subset
of warnings they are most interested in. In the FindBugs GUI, we have implemented
navigation by class, package, bug pattern, and bug category. Users may also filter
warnings by category and priority. These navigation features allow developers to
quickly focus on particular warning types or code regions.
B.2 Tool Integration
Another important consideration for static analysis tools is integration with other
development tools and environments. Of particular importance is making the tool
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easy to run from the developer’s build system, so it can be integrated as a regular
part of the development process.
FindBugs may be plugged into a development environment in several ways.
First, it supports a batch mode interface, which may be invoked from a script. It also
integrates with the ubiquitous Ant [3] build tool, and with the Maven [52] project
management system. These interfaces make it easy to analyze code with FindBugs
on demand or as part of a nightly or weekly build.
In addition to providing a convenient way to run a static analysis tool, it
is critical to provide a way to store the warnings in a persistent form. FindBugs
supports several output formats. In addition to a plain text format, FindBugs can
emit warnings as XML [68]. The XML-based format fully preserves all information
associated with each warning, including all of its attributes. This format may be
read and written by the GUI interface: this makes it possible to save the results of
static analysis for later inspection.
While XML is useful as generic format for storing structured data, it is not
particularly well-suited as a presentation format to be read by humans. FindBugs in-
cludes an XSL stylesheet for converting the XML format to human-readable HTML.
This allows FindBugs warnings to be viewed in any web browser.
In addition to batch mode tools, FindBugs also provides a plugin for the
Eclipse Integrated Development Environment [19]. While the Eclipse plugin is not
as full-featured as the other interfaces supported by FindBugs, it performs analysis
continuously as source code is modified. This allows developers to see possible errors
as soon as they are introduced.
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B.3 Handling False Positives
As developers fix problems identified by static analysis, over time an increasingly
large percentage of the warnings will be false positives. In order to avoid pestering
the user with these warnings every time the tool is run, the tool must offer a way
to suppress them.
It is worth noting that suppression of uninteresting warnings is an issue for
all static analysis tools, and not just those which admit false warnings. While
it is possible to engineer a static analysis so that all warnings reported are real
bugs (according to some definition of correctness), in practice not all bugs will be
considered worth fixing by developers.
A very simple approach to suppressing false positives, which we have imple-
mented in FindBugs, is to provide developers a means of determining which warnings
are new after code changes. Assuming that it is possible to precisely determine when
a warning is “the same” from one version of the code to the next, limiting inspection
to newly-introduced warnings ensures that developers will only need to inspect any
warning once.
In practice, it is not always possible to determine when two warnings in dif-
ferent versions correspond to the same issue. This imprecision may cause some
warnings to be wrongly classified as new, requiring developers to inspect them more
than once over the lifetime of the software. It may also result in some warnings to be
wrongly classified as old, resulting in warnings which are never inspected. However,
as long as the matching technique is sufficiently accurate overall, this approach can
150
be a simple and effective way of handling false positives.
We have also implemented source-level annotations [42] for the suppression of
false warnings. Because these annotations are part of the source code, they have
the advantage of being completely unambiguous. Once in place, they will continue
to suppress the specified warnings even if the annotated class or method is renamed
or modified. However, this advantage is also a limitation: if the code is modified,
the suppressed warning or warnings may no longer exist, making the annotation
unnecessary. The tool may assist the user in this situation by reporting suppression
attributes which no longer apply to any warnings. Another problem with the source
annotation approach is that annotations can only apply at the granularity of an
entire method or class: this may result in some valid warnings being suppressed.
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